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1.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this work is to present the side of Lotze 's
philosophy that deals primarily with theism and discover whether
the conclusions from this point of view agree or differ with
those from the points of view of the theory of thought and the
theory of reality as expressed by Henry Jones and E. E. Thomas
respectively. Since theism is a dominant theme in the history
of philosophy and Lotze felt that one must know the history of
man's thought to deal with it adequately the first part of the
work considers Lotze' s relations with the thought of his own day
that of Plato and Aristotle and that of the intervening years
from Aristotle to Lotze.
The second part considers the expressions of Lotze that
bear on the sub.lect. The principal work dealt with is Microcos-
mus for it develops the theory of man's culture particularly in
regard to experience wherein the answer to the question of the-
ism seems to lie. Lotze takes the expressions of the past, adds
his own experience and interprets in the light of his own system
The third part attempts by reference to scattered instances
to show how Lotze 's system with its emphasis on theism has ef-
fected the minds of those who follow him. It does not seek com-
pleteness but rather desires to show new lines of thought
stretching out from this central position of theism to prove
Lotze 's own thought that the experience of value would prove
theism as far as it is possible to do so in our present stage of
growth.
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2CHAPTER I
ORIENTATION
Every individual thinker who contributes to the world’s
knowledge through the realm of creativity stands at an apex
point in history. He must not only depend upon but must im-
merse himself in the past. He feels intensely the implications
of his own personal life in its relations to the present. And
he is led by an insight into the future that is characterized by
hope. Hermann Lotze is such a man. He stands at a point that
is designated by the middle of the nineteenth century for he
lived within its borders though close to each, 1807 - 1881. His
thought stands in close relationship to the two great streams of
thought that had come down from Plato and Aristotle. In fact he
seems to be at the point where the two find a synthesis in the
recognition of the reality of both the idea and the scientific
particular. He walks with "his head in the clouds" and "his
feet on the ground"
„
Lotze' s works find their value in the fact that their ulti-
»
mate significance is in the energy of thought and fineness of
feeling expressed which take the principles of the past and
shape them to new life and vigor. The two fields of metaphysics
and empirical science which had grown so far apart or had become
stagnant in the scholastic tradition of Albertus Magnus and
Thomas Aquinas are brought into new relationship and made vi-
brant by the stimulating impressions that each receives from the
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3other. This tends toward a monism that yet does not deny the
dualistic character of the method through which knowledge is
given. Here the facts of objective experience are equaled in
validity by those of subjective reflection. The series of forms
of thought are a systematic whole as developed out of the prob-
lems or tasks of thinking. The two work together toward a
single objective and the result is an intermingling of effects
that ire stimulating to both fields.
The vital activity as the spiritual essence of the real
world has the good as its end and this justifies Lotze's thought
that all metaphysics has its beginning in ethics. The mechanism
of nature is the form in which the activity works. The concep-
tion of value is very essential for it conforms to the type of
good that Kant characterized in his Summum Bonurn as that which
would be good for every individual. Lotze had studied medicine
and the physical sciences under Volkmann and where Hegelianism
had given way to pure natural science Lotze helped philosophy
regain a place of honor in the hierarchy of the sciences. He
studied the movements of thought in positivism, materialism, crit-
icism and post-Kantian idealism and rejected the extremes of each
while retaining the essential core of truth that each contained.
He tended to reject the theory of the a priori and subjective
idealism and also the dialectical methods of a large part of the
German school although he might be classified as a descendant of
German idealism.
He agreed with Kant’s position in the Critique of Pure Rea-
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4son that there can be no knowledge in science and philosophy
without experience. He also held with positivism that there
a J v
can't be a system of metaphysics possessing absolute certainty
and thus intimated the superiority of the subjective realm par-
tially because of its unknowability
. He combined the monadology
of Leibnitz with the pantheism of Spinoza which sought to recon-
cile monism and pluralism, mechanism and teleology, realism and
idealism, pantheism and theism and he called it teleological
idealism. He held to ethical-religious idealism which was also
expressed by Fichte as well as to a scientific interpretation of
natural phenomena.
In his emphasis on the natural sciences Lotze said that one
cannot understand interaction or causal efficiency as the influ-
ence of one thing on another without regarding the manifold pro-
cesses of nature as states of one and the same all-comprehending
substance, He sought as many before him had done complete one-
ness in regard to matter. There was a suggestion of idealistic
pantheism which is one way out when one considers the theistic
principle. But Lotze carried his monistic emphasis through to
the subjective realm for he interpreted the universal substance
as the highest reality we know; that is personality, a good be-
ing, the God of love. Wilhelm Wundt, born in 1832, was later to
express this same theory at Heidelberg as he reflected Lotze'
s
influence. James Ward, born in 1843, asserted in like vein the
idealistic emphasis of Lotze.
Kant's moral "ought" shows up very strongly in Lotze. This
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is teleological idealism in one expression as metaphysics finds
its beginning in ethics. There is provision for the three fac-
tors in teleology; ground, cause and end. This often shows the
limitations of Spinoza, Herbart, Hegel and others who are rather
one-sided and do not consider all three. The modern idealism of
Schelling and Hegel attempted to deduce all from the Absolute,
but they failed because of their reach beyond human power. They
despised mechanism and missed the factor which Lotze realized
was so essential though he tended to play down his own writings
on the subject in the face of his larger interest in the subjec-
tive. The works that he did carry through on the subject of
mechanism and the like are generally respected for their factual
integrity. Pathology t Life and Life-Force , Physiology and Med-
ical Psychology are the major works in this field.
Volkmann had led him carefully through the paths of the med
ical sciences and was his intimate friend as well as respected
adviser. The fact that Weisse in the field of philosophy had
not cut sharply across the lines of the natural had also been of
great help to Lotze. Through two fine personalities and true
scholars he had found respect for both fields so that he was
later able to bring them together without loss of prestige for
either. Lotze was definitely known as being opposed to Fichte
for his Controver sarial Writings were a sharp reply to that
writer. But whereas he was really against Herbart he has often
been considered as one of the Herbartian school because in the
third part of Metaphysics he described sensations as self-asser-
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6tions of the soul when disturbed.
Lotze was led into the study of philosophy by a strong feel -
ing for poetry and art. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel had all de-
veloped ideas into a well-expressed mode of culture rather than
into a finished system of doctrine. He longed for ever finer
expressions of culture and his scientific training made his ex-
pression even more beautiful in that it was orderly. He testi-
fied many times in his writings to the influence of Weisse for
the ideas of this great teacher were often expressed and Lotze
held to the validity of some of these throughout his life. As
medicine led him to the realization of the necessity for natural
science he cut the ground from under many of Hegel's views. His
realism, theory of simple essences and perception of truth that
causality occurs only where there is a plurality of causes put
firm emphasis on the various effects of the objective world. If
anyone showed him the way to this thought it was Leibnitz with
his theory of monads.
Though Herbart arouses an antipathy in him his fundamental
theory is like that of Fichte. The idea of the good is suffi-
cient ground for all existence. Moral values are the key to
forms. Yet Lotze doesn't restrict the good to the domain of ac-
tion. He shows the blissful calm of inactive contemplation and
here in his poetry and art he often seems to soar off into the
realm of the mystic. Weisse and George are the only ones who
can come up to him in G-erman thought in regard to intellectual
grasp and acuteness of discernment. His seeking mind ranges far
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and seems never to reach its boundaries as it is especially char-
acterized by a lack of dogma. He was truly a philosopher who
lived up to the highest concept of his profession. He sought
truth and that alone. Perhaps this lead him away from the pri-
mary motive of a school for his academic spirit is so strong
that he often finds it hard to lead his students through the
many devious pathways necessary to their development. He rather
sought to drive directly to the essential point to be considered
and often left his students behind. But then appreciating their
dilemma he would return to them and find his greatest truths in
simple expression.
Lotze sustains Fechner in Nanna as regards the likeness of
plants and animals and warns in contrast to this against going
too far in the theory of types. He was continually tempering
abstract systems of smooth appearance with the rough edges of
practical situations. He put man in the highest place in the
scale of knowable things and insisted that going beyond man was
unstable inquiry. But Lotze carried animate existence further
down the scale than Fechner since he held that the elements of
that which is material in animals also have feeling. He rejects
on the other side the idea that celestial bodies have souls and
here criticizes Herbart and Hegel.
Fuller makes the statement that Lotze attempted to bring all
psycho-physical phenomena within the bounds of a strictly mechan-*
1
ical theory. It is possible to agree with Mr. Fuller if he holds
1 - ,B. A. G-. Fuller, A History of Philosophy
, p. 501.
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8to the definition of science concerning the word, theory, that
it is a verified hypothesis applicable to many related phenomena,
But the term, related, must be born clearly in mind. There is
no attempt to confine these phenomena to the realm of the logi-
cal positivist in that they are of one type. They are merely
related. Mr. Fuller's words, "strictly mechanical", rather con-
fuse this point as they suggest a limited range to the objective ,
It is only as they are kept on the level of the purely theoreti-
cal that they can fulfill their precise definition. It must be
made clear that Lotze gave a large place to emotion without cut-
ting it adrift from his main emphasis on logic. Here again he
was influenced by Leibnitz and Weisse who attacked the over-em-
phasis of Hegel on the head with too little notice of the heart.
Sven scientific knowledge was seen by Lotze as an act of
faith in the existence of truth and in the power of reason to
attain it. This faith cannot be proved any more than the valid-
ity of our conviction that phenomena exist or that values like
beauty and goodness are real. His theism was supreme in showing
how the demands of phenomenal fact, of logical truth and of
moral value can be met by one and the same world. He attacked
Fichte's view that there can be no ego without a non-ego and
therefore interaction and intercommunication are necessary to
personal self-consciousness. This was a further step toward the
monism of the whole. He said that self-consciousness is bound
up with the mere fact of existence in and for itself whether or
not the thing so existing has a non-ego with which to contrast
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itself. This suggests different degrees of self-consciousness.
Perhaps human personalities need contrast, but not G-od who is
the ultimate degree.
Like Fechner and Von Hartman he was not only spiritualistic
in metaphysics but was one of the founders of experimental and
physiological psychology. His reliance on the scientifically ob-
jective was always apparent in this seeming digression from the
natural. Another contemporary who was like Lotze in represent-
ing Kantian and spiritualistic motives not only but the influ-
ence of science as well was Renouvier. It is interesting to
note that Lotze, Wundt and Ward, mentioned together previously,
were all physiologists. But Weber and Perry relate Lange to Lot-
ze and Ritschl in respect to the judging of ideals independently
2
of their reference to fact. Lotze was by no means bound to the
limits of the contemporary natural science of his day. He drew
on it largely for methods and recognized the hypothetical char-
acter of many facts.
Lotze'
s
work in aesthetics was significant in anticipating
the theory of empathy, Einffthlung
,
according to which the enjoy-
ment of aesthetics in form, such as symmetry is occasioned by
the perception of corresponding movements and tensions in the or-
ganism. Again science and beauty were closely related and there
was further suggestion of the monism of the one source. Faith
in reason is the only final base of all knowledge and the emotior
2 - Alfred Weber and Ralph Barton Perry, History of Philosophy,
p. 466.
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A
of beauty and the logic of symmetry are equal pillars on this
base. Since all of the elements of reality react to one another
in a way that is determined to a great extent, it must be con-
cluded that the nature of each is implicated in the nature of
the rest, or that all parts are of one substance which is a vi-
tally connected whole. Thus Lotze ’ s ultimate view of nature is
monistic rather than monadistic and here he definitely modifies
the view of Leibnitz.
The key to all of this is that the substance or whole (the
word, substance, was in common usage in the time of Lotze though
it is rather frowned upon now), itself recognizes such changes
and parts as its own. Only spiritual subjects exercise this
3
function and can be regarded as ultimately real. We follow the
trail of these subjective particulars through our finite selves
to GrOd. Lotze really illustrates the two sides of the problem of
knowledge as he shows intelligence fashioning its world out of
that which is exceedingly indefinite and also follows a webwork
of things and relations that is supplied by nature. He feels
that each of these two emphases is necessary for they both supply
a lack, but then he goes on to show that they are contained in
each other. Yet many times it seems hard for him to make a
choice between the two as it has been hard for philosophers of
all ages and perhaps this makes him more instructive in the rec-
ognition of the problem. Too many of the world’s thinkers have
been completely one-sided on the question. Theism demands both
3 - Microcosmus
,
B. 9, Ch. 3; Metaphysics, B. 1, Ch. 7.
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sides for its explanation. Lotze had the extraordinary power
that so many have copied since his time of seeing both sides in
this particular problem and he would not avert his eyes from
4
either
.
From the position of the general doctrine of being or ontol-
ogy he makes a positive assertion. Like Hegel and Herbart in
giving a constructive system he gives first place to a general
discussion of the most universal characteristics that we find
ourselves constrained to ascribe in thought to any reality which
is to be an intelligible and coherent system and not a mere chao:
All attempts to formulate a theory of the way in which the what
of things flows from a mere that, are attempts to answer the ab-
5
surd question as to how being is made. The notion that things
have a that or substance prior to their what or quality, and con-
sisting simply in being which is not this or that determinate
mode of being, is thus without meaning as well as superfluous.
As demands vary from time to time, the behaviour of the pari
under consideration will then vary correspondingly
,
though to al]
appearance its surroundings may, for a spectator who fails to
6
grasp the end or purpose realized by the system, be identical.
There is no ultimate logical principle in virtue of which we are
constrained to think of the particular quantities vie denote as
mass and energy as incapable of increase or diminution, nor agair
have we any experimental means of proving that those quantities
4 - Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, p. 58.
5 " Metaphysics, B. 1, Chs. 1 & 2.
c ” Metaphysics, B. 1, Ch. 3, Sec. 33; B. 1, Ch. 7, Sec. 208 ff.
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are more than approximately constant* But to calculate there is
needed some quantitative identity as an a priori postulate of
7
mechanical construction. This postulation is made possible
through the use of the function of intelligence* “The most
solid part of our conviction was that the highest, most unbend-
ing, most general and most necessary law anywhere presented to
us by the world is but the self-imposed condition on which the
8
one creative Infinite has based its eternal evolution."1 Bright-
man states this whole position in a very comprehensive phrase as
he says that Lotze combines theism with an Idealistic view of
9
nature
.
Mlcrocosmus has rich empirical material and it is from this
background that Lotze speaks with a new voice. He turned the
field of philosophy from its metaphysical trend toward abstract-
ness and brought it down to earth. He sank his foundations deep
into the soil of personal experience and was ever mindful of the
objective reflections of that experience. Yet he did not lose
the subjective point of view. It was really his starting point
and he never left it for the ease of scientific complacency.
7 Metaphysics . B. 2, Ch. 7*
8 - Mlcrocosmus
. p. 395.
9 - E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion , p. 159.
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CHAPTER II
PLATO
In many respects Plato* s thought of God and the universe is
difficult to relate to that of Lotze for the two were developed
against such different backgrounds. Yet there are many emphases
through which a similarity and kinship may be traced. The term,
God, is applied in the writings of Plato both to the mover and
the moved. The suggestion is that of many gods with each having
an effect on some part of the whole. Through this there runs a
semblance of unity in that all the gods are characterized by an
otherness that is not available to man. This otherness is able
to transcend the bounds of the natural as man knows it and in
doing so has a control over or an effect upon the natural. This
early idea is expressed much more clearly in Lotze *s thought as
he establishes God in direct relationship to nature.
Yet in spite of necessary changes over a period of evolu-
tionary development the two thinkers are in close contact with
each other. God is as much a part of their metaphysics as He is
a part of their religion. In fact, religion is to them only one
process in the whole development of man's thought, for science
and normal living lead to God just as much as the worship of Him
does. Religious Insight is a form of knowledge and God is the
sustaining ground of all things. Thus knowledge of Him may be
reached through all fields. This concept that both men have in
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common brings about the realization that here is a philosophical
insight that has been exceedingly prominent through the ages
with the most respected of philosophical thinkers. Lotze was
able to establish it in his system to an extent that had never
been known before. The way that he traces its activity through
the natural order is particularly significant to a world that is
not able to accept the animistic view of nature that was popular
in Plato* s time and to a large extent for many centuries after
him. In fact it might be said that this type of world first be-
gan to find itself in the beginnings of the last century with
the emphasis that was being placed upon the natural sciences.
The attempt at a science of psychology of which Lotze was one of
the founders is an indication of the demand that has so recently
arisen for a justifiable relationship between the mind and its
natural object.
Plato is often quite close to the Christian tradition of
God for this tradition is partly a result of the emphasis of Pla«)
tonism. The God that Plato describes has moral perfection and
although God is not directly a person in his thought God does
look on the world with loving care and works continually for the
good of man. Here are repeated many of the characteristics that
Christian philosophers have ascribed to God and surely in this
light there may be seen the parallel with the God that Lotze up-
holds with his argument. Lotze began with ethics.
The main assumption of both men was that the natural world
required an explanation and ground in a realm other than itself.
This need felt throughout the ages has been the prime motive be-
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hind the position held by metaphysics, Lotze and Plato are again)
in agreement as to the general line of argument that supports
this venture into another realm. The fact that there is order in
the world is the starting point. The teleological process is
clearly apparent as it drives the world toward one final goal,
the good. Ethics must be the realization of purpose in the minds
of both of these men for they see the need of mankind of learning
how to live together. The beautiful orderly process that is in
nature must be brought into the mind of man as well as into his
bodily functions. Good is the result of orderliness and just as
there is disturbance in the physical organism when it is treated
roughly so there are repercussions in the mind when it faces a
hostile situation.
The Tlmaeus brings out rather forcibly the thought of Plato
that there must be posited a mind that will grasp the structure
of the abstract order and impress it upon the physical world that
we know. Thus the individual must turn to this same mind to find
the order for his mental and psychological existence. A mind
that is complete and powerful enough for such a function is ne-
cessary and it is here that Plato and Lotze find God. This
thought does not carry completely throughout the rest of Plato's
works. He is merely feeling his way while Lotze has the benefits
of a long Platonic tradition developed and improved. Yet the es-
sential truth is the same.
The world needs a cause. "It is impossible for anything to
IQ
attain becoming without a cause. Thus God is the creative in—
— ** W* a. «.s.a*
10 - Tlmaeus
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.
telligence that Is the efficient cause of the world ground. Lot-
ze carries on to a position of constantly recurring creativity in
which God is in continual contact with the world but here again
it is the development of an established theory. Lotze's position
here is not that merely of repetition. He has been able to clear}
away the chaff of the intervening years and discover for his own
thinking the truth of the Platonic thought. The fact that Plato
does not always hold himself rigidly to this thought or state it
as clearly as it is later stated further emphacizes Lotze's abil*^
ity in the field of selection and clarification.
In the development of the effect that God's creative intel-
ligence has upon the world Lotze is not nearly so rigidly ideal-
istic. In speaking of the work that Christianity has tried to
do he says that "in conflict with mundane circumstances and human
passions, and yet linked to both as the instruments of its real-
ization, no ideal can, in the course of its historical develop-
11
ment, remain faithful to its full perfection". Yet though the
two men realize many differences in the method by which the Cause
has its effect upon the world their fundamental assumption is in
character the same. The changes in method are largely due to
Lotze's recognition of the seeming vagaries in the physical orderf.
It might be said that Lotze is a more practical man with the ad-
vantage of more advanced scientific knowledge.
Yet through it all they both want to find God. This is
their great desire. They recognize the need for something which
11 - Mlcrocosmus
, Bk. VI, p. 273.
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Is outside the natural order and now they want to know what that
something is and how it is able to express itself in the way that
it does. Here they enter the great realm of speculation which is
quite an intellectually respectable process if a rational system
is adhered to. Insight plays a large part and from this is de-
veloped the explanation of concepts and argument based on exper-
!
i
iential observation. But here we find a parting of the ways.
Plato does not hold that God is absolute or infinite while Lotze
does. Plato substitutes the receptacle and the ideal pattern as
those things which are uncreated and timeless and finds God in a
subsidiary position as being a created thing himself. Plato does
not get his student out of the dilemma that is thus set before
him and here his argument falls far short of the high standard
that Lotze maintains. Much of this is due to the position that
the two men hold in the evolutionary process of thinking. It is
unfair to compare them unless this fact is always kept before oui
minds. It should be recognized also that we are trying to find
the principle of agreement in the nature of ideas and not in the
elaboration except as it contributes to the essential nature.
This orderliness of life is further exemplified in the high
regard in which both men held beauty. Plato is often a critic
of the arts and artists, yet his continued emphasis on aesthetics
reveals his own inner feeling. He feels that the aesthetic mo-
ment should not merely be a moment, but an extended duration and
he also declares that music has a greater influence oh morals
than anything else. Lotze entered the field of philosophy pri-
marily rather than that of mathematics because he wished the
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,
overtones that were there superimposed upon the mathematical or-
der. In both the aesthetic feeling is expressed through every
activity as the one supreme principle makes its beauty felt
through all things. Both reach inspirational heights though per-
haps Plato goes beyond Lotze in fervor while Lotze is restrained
by his emphasis on logic and clarity. Their emphasis on the fine
arts is a deduction from this metaphysical position that they
have in common. It is the expression of that which is great and
wonderful through the ordinary and the mundane. It is man reach-
ing the heights without leaving the foundation of his own obser-
vable experience.
Concerning the nature of the soul there is a difference of
opinion. Plato sees the soul as having the ability to mediate
between mind and nature in such a way that it has a degree of
control. But it has such a subsidiary position that it nowhere
reaches the position of complete responsibility that Lotze as-
cribes to it. He considers it to be the one source of the abil-
ity of the individual to deal intelligently with external nature.
He maintains that the soul is not the product of such external
nature, but is complete and independent in its own right. But
the important point of agreement is that the soul as both men seel
it carries out certain functions that could not be done on the
purely natural level. It is a subjective function and here again
is the relationship of the natural world to an otherness that
finds its center and ground in God.
The idea of the good is also an essential to the thought of
both Lotze and Plato. Plato makes it the one final standard that
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shall be adhered to in all particulars. It is the ultimate ex-
planation of all activity and it is the most fundamental factor
in metaphysics. Ultimate value and ultimate being are joined in
this great expression. The good is the absolute power. Lotze
does not give the good such an independent character. He makes
it an attribute of the person of G-od. But then this is the crux
of the difference in the thought of these men for Plato holds
that ideals are real while Lotze makes them characteristics of
real personality. Thus the good runs through all of Lotze's
theory and explanation having a tremendous effect even if it is
not always triumphant. But as the mind is able to control its
activities toward a good end so does the good come into being.
’’Good and good things do not exist as such independent of the
feeling, willing and knowing mind; they have reality only as
12
living movements of such a mind.”
Although the Platonic Eros and the Christian Agape must not
13
be confused as Nygren states, both meaning love yet coming from
two different backgrounds of thought, the love that is in the
soul is another vital factor in this comparison. The good and
the beautiful are synonymous in Plato and it is this love that
responds to the good. The good and the beautiful may also be re-
lated in Lotze for a thing is beautiful where it is an orderly
expression of the great Intelligence in nature as well as in hu-
man activity. Thus in human activity as order prevails both
12 - Mlcrocosmu a, Bk. IX, p. 721.
13 - Nygren, Agape and Eros
.
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beauty and goodness are brought about. The ultimate dream of
love is an order between men in which they may be completely at
peace with each other through an understanding of each other*
s
mind that would if carried to its final point result in mutual
absorption. In Lotze, love, goodness and beauty all find their
expression on the same level while in Plato the good and the beau)}
tiful are absolute and identical norms that the individual sub-
mits to through the activity of love. The great aim of both is
an orderly process controlled by a unifying intelligent factor.
The theme of God in life as we know it is the strength of the di^r
cussion and Plato and Lotze have their eyes fixed on the same
goal.
The concept of mind finds a similar expression in these two.
They both feel that the mind is in its very nature perhaps the
most active feature of the world. Plato decries fixation and
complacency. Truth comes leaping into the mind only after it has
sought out many avenues of expression through continuous appli-
14
cation of the activity of the mind. Lotze puts his emphasis on
the mind rather than on truth as Plato does. Both men consider
the importance of mind and truth, but they disagree as to which
is the most fundamental. Yet they do agree on this feature of
activity. To support the thought of Plato just above Lotze says,
"A universal desire after knowledge and a universal tendency
towards complicated action are ....... natural instincts of the
15
human mind”. This activity is pertinent in that with both men it
14 •• Epistle 3
.
341c, d.
13 • Mlcrocosmus , Bk. V, p. 657*
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is reaching toward the one end of truth and thus the good. It
demonstrates the character of man. He is not satisfied with mere
natural explanation, he wants something more that has an eternal
||
character. 3y his very nature he is a seeker after higher values
and through them the figure of God who is associated with them.
Men often go off the track, it is true. They are often confused
and led astray by the many opinions and types of combinations
that appear in the world of affairs, but inherently they seek the
good. There is no other end that will sate their longing.
The principle of reason stands out very clearly in any elab-
oration of either man*s thought. It moves more gently in Plato
than it does in the scientifically minded Lotze, but it still
wields great strength. Plato follows Lotze in moving down into
the practical world. In spite of his emphasis on the reality of
ideas he does not draw away into monastic separateness but in the
Republic fulfills the need for sr discussion concerning the appli-j
cation of his theory to the social sphere. As a member of a
social organism he feels its pressure upon him very decidedly and
responds with some practical suggestions that still have a weigh*
ty effect upon sociological theorists. He feels that a philoso-
pher takes on public office unwillingly but will accept his duty
and because of his unwillingness and emphasis on the thought life
will be a good administrator in taking the broad view of practi-
cal affairs. Lotze, of course, is much closer to earth in this
respect. He is primarily interested in developing a way of life
for the present and the world that we meet in dally life. He
wants to find the end to which the Supreme Will bends the course
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of its uniform progress and so he says that since this is his ain
then “attention is in the first place attracted to the conditions
22
of external nature under which we are placed and their varied in-*
16
fluence upon us, whether obvious or unobserved”.
Thus though both men seem to proceed on the basis of the
same fundamental presuppositions Lotze takes a greater interest
in the practical aspect of physical life. This practical empha-
sis leads him through many involved discussions concerning the
physical organism and these take up a large part of his most com-*
plete work, Mlcrocosmus
. Yet they are so constantly related to
the workings of G-od in the world as being a part of those work-
ings that the principle aim of the work is adequately fulfilled.
Metaphysics is given its expression through the natural order.
It is from this same consideration that the later develop-
ments in psychology come. Psychology must necessarily consider
the nervous system and physical reflexes of the organism and yet
it does so merely to discover the more vital truth, the inner
workings of the mind. The psychical characteristics of person-
ality are gradually revealed and although no absolute objective
observations of personality may be expressed as certainty, certi-
tude may be considered a valid result. When this certitude
reaches a point where it borders on universality then it may held
a place that is very close to if not actually certainty. This is
perhaps the greatest advance that Lotze makes over Plato in re-
lating God to the natural world.
16 - Mlcrocosmus, Bk. VI, p. 6..
*i j ; : i :•
-
*
,
-
-
-
-
j f
l • .• h;\
t
-
•'
*
.
.
' V <
*
» t -
Yet even in this field of contact between the subjective and
objective Plato has many suggestions that fit in very well with
the Lotzian theory. Plato* s doctrine of human nature is particu-j
larly applicable in its consideration of the complexity of the
soul. He says that human nature is both divine and earthly. It
is this thought that has made such a strong impression on Chris-
tian thought through men like Paul and Augustine. It is the same
fundamental idea that is the basis for all theistic thought. The
medium in an interpretive sense between God and the world is man.
While Plato's strongest emphasis is on the good he admits that
man may turn away from the good. This leaves only one fundamen-
tal characteristic to be considered for Plato does not recognize
the presence of evil except as a turning away from the good. It
is later Augustine's devotional expression, "Thou hast made us
for Thyself, 0 God, and our hearts are restless 'til they rest in
17
Thee”
•
Lotze does not show such complete dependence on the one side
He gives man metaphysical freedom of such nature that he may to
a large extent work out his own position in relation to God and
yet hi3 view of the world does establish the fact that man must
meet God at every turn in some form of expression or another.
Plato says that reason is the driving force in this activity of
man. It is the controlling force in conduct both for Plato and
18
his teacher, Socrates. If one has knowledge of a thing he will
probably be driven to act according to the good of that thing al
17 --Augustine, Confessions
.
18 - Flato, Protagoras
, 352b, c..
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though Plato admits that this is not an absolute in every partic-
ular, Yet the essential thing is to get knowledge. It is virtue,
Plato has put reason above desire and with this tendency Lotze is
in agreement. This is a sharp break from the theories of human
nature that have been upheld by so many thinkers both before and
after Lotze, They have begun with desire and tried to find the
answer to man's place in the world. It seems that here they go
astray and Lotze has made one of his greatest contributions to
modern philosophy in staying on the side that Plato established,.
He admits the place of desire, but shows it to be merely a devel-
opment from the more basic position of reason. He keeps it still
subordinate to the one eternal overlying principle that he is
searching for and uses reason with all of its fine developments
merely to find that "something more", "The shadow of antiquity,
its mischievous over-estimation of reason, still lies upon us,
and prevents our seeing, either in the real or in the ideal, what
19
it is that makes both something more than reason,"
19 - Microcosmus . Bk. VIII, p. 360,
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CHAPTER III
ARISTOTLE
Early in his thinking Aristotle followed his teacher, Plato,
fairly closely. He agreed with Plato’s idealism and theism, his
doctrine of immortality and his dualistic ethics,. But he soon
began to move away from this position, and the relationship that
we find to Lotze involves this later thought. Aristotle and Lot-
ze were much alike in temperament. Where Plato moved off into
realms of abstraction inspired by deep emotion they remained on
the ordinary levels of experience and kept close to the practical
aspect, Lotze saw Plato's position very clearly as we have tried
to show, but he recognized it as the result of certain logical
considerations. This recognition of all observable evidence as
well as that obtained through introspection is the strong link
that bound Lotze to the Aristotelian method, if not always the
Aristotelian conclusions. In fact it does not seem to be too
much of a generalization to say that Lotze agreed largely with
Plato in his conclusions and premises while he stayed close to
Aristotle in regard to method and evidence.
Aristotle defines space with extreme mathematical precision.
It is complete and all physical objects have a place in it; thus
they are all related. The system of physics is worked out on
this solid basis. It is one of the dependables of all considera~
tion. There is no possibility of void and space has a solid
quality that makes it measurable. Lotze depends on this sy sterna-
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tic exposition for his development. The empirical level is firm-
ly grounded and can be depended upon to produce evidence of qual-
ity.
o
Lotze states the contributions that these two thinkers made.
He first refers to Plato. "Plato’s doctrine of ideas was the
first attempt to grasp the nature of the thing in general con-
cepts - a grand attempt which, though unsuccessful, yet exercised
20
an influence for long ages to come." But Plato often omits re-
lationship and system and as Lotze says, "Aristotle was sensible
of these deficiencies; a taste for the observation of nature, and
systematic occupation with the forms of thought, drew his atten-
tion to the numerous relations which connect the individual ele-
ments of reality into one living whole, and to the ways in which !
21
these relations are expressed by our thought". Lotze also has
"a taste for the observation of nature " 0 He develops his thought 1
along lines of natural scientific inquiry that would do justice
to a scientist of the highest caliber in any age.
Time is necessary as a measuring factor and is united to
space by motion which takes place within the limits of space. As
Aristotle says, "Time is the measure, or number of motion in re-
22
spect of ’before* and ’after'." Lotze looks on it in just as
practical manner, but where Ariatotle so often confines himself
to the particular Lotze refers to the broader aspects.. He looks
20 - Microcosmus
.
3k. VIII, p. 325.
21 - Microcosmus
.
Bk. VIII, p. 329.
22 - Physics
.
IV, 220a, 11, 24-25.
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on the period of historical time over a long range as making
great contributions to the thinking of the one who will reflect
on their meaning* He will net confine himself to any definite
formula of direction for he shows how history moves from an un-
known beginning to an unknown ending* Yet he does see the tre-
mendous implications of great periods of civilization as lessons
from the forces that work in history*
In spite of the lack of data that was available in his day
Aristotle's theory of astronomy was surprisingly accurate for he
developed it on the system of spheres and circles even as stars
are known today to move in circular forms or orbits. But Aristo-
tle's chief interest was in the field of biology and it is here
that he comes closest to Lotze as Lotze discusses nature* Aris-
totle sees the appearance of the soul in the transition from in-
organic to organic bodies and this soul is a combination of var-
ious elements presented in the organism. Lotze cuts the soul
away from that which is purely organic and yet his consideration
of its existence involves the characteristics of a highly devel-
oped organism*
Aristotle says that the soul is the first actuality of a na-
23
tural body furnished with organs. But this makes the soul en-
tirely dependent upon the body. If the forms of the body were
not present the soul could not exist. Lotze admits a bond and an
interaction between body and soul, but he definitely states that
24
the soul is not a resultant of physical actions. In making this
23 * De Anima, II, 412b.
24 - Metaphysic
,
Bk. Ill, Ch. I, p. 191*
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break Lotze finds his way into advanced statements of psychical”
mechanism and the relation of that to the physical. Aristotle
saw that the soul was not a physical substance, but he did not
break over into the explanation that Lotze was later able to give
It is especially interesting to realize that the basic elements
of our modern psychology were lying dormant in the early theory
of Aristotle. Yet these very essentials were forced to wait for
one who could sympathize with and understand both Plato and Aris
totle. One who was led by visions of the beautiful and divine
and yet who walked the ways of medical science.
Though all of the elements were present it took an Involved
study of metaphysics to bring them out for psychology has its
foundation in metaphysics. This is not the method of natural
science and though natural science contains much of the material
that is involved in the study, it is in metaphysics that the
drive originates. Yet through all of this it was the purpose of
both Lotze and Aristotle to bring the discussion down to the
realm of practical experience. Aristotle holds that "the imper-
soaal, universal, superindividual and self-identical character of
the actualization of the potential intellect in all human organ-
isms is not so abstruse and remote from everyday life as it seem^
25
at first sight.. It is a matter of common experience." . Lotze
says that "every soul is what it shows itself to be, unity whose
26
life is in definite ideas, feelings and efforts".
25 - Fuller, History of Philosophy
. p. 147.
26 - Metaphysic
.
Bk. Ill, Ch. I, p. 181..
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In the discu33ion concerning God there ie found a tendency
•
toward agreement and yet Aristotle emphacizes the transcendence
of God while Lotze establishes His immanence without destroying
any of the power that is generally regarded as belonging to a
transcendent God, Lotze shows how the active reason of man
comes very close to the Divine Mind especially in its more re-
flective processes. But Aristotle feels that there are only
slight flashes of insight on the part of man that unite him with
the truth of divinity. These flashes are very meager in quanity
and quality, Lotze’ 3 position is dependent on his consideration
of the soul and its ability as thought, "The soul, without its
unity being on that account endangered, is itself everywhere
present where, in the connection of all things, its own states
27
have attached to them the consequent states of other elements."
Aristotle makes the active reason the only thing that is
immortal in man. It survives though all else that is known to us
disappears. But at the 3ame time it survives us also for we
share the mortality of our organic structures and their expres-
sions, Lotze gives the same high place to active reason, but
shows that the starting point of the activity is in the soul.
Thus as it depends upon the soul for its origin it is made a char
acteristic of the ultimate quality of a person, the soul,. Here
the immortality of the active reason is incidental to the eternal
ity of the soul and thus active reason finds a solid basis in the
subjective metaphysical sphere. But still the question concern-
27 - Metaphysic. Bk. III. Ch. V. p. 300.
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ing the immortality of the soul does not belong to metaphysics
V
according to Lotze.. The human mind does not have the power of
decision in this matter. Lotze says that he can rely only on the:
general idealistic conviction; " that every created thing will
continue, if and so long as its continuance belongs to the mean-
ing of the world; that everything will pass away which had its
authorized place only in a transitory phase of the world's
28
course 1 ’
.
He goes on in a consideration of this problem concerning
the origin of the soul, but never gots beyond this fundamental
statement. His attempt is merely to help others to understand
why he must come to this conviction. Lotze is perfectly frank
to admit that there are some questions even beyond the jurisdic-
tion of metaphysics as we know it and open only to divinity.
In the matter of ethics Aristotle conditions Plato's posi-
tion that ethics rests upon absolute knowledge of a transcendent
good. He says that the nature of right and wrong is rather to
be inferred by using perceived facts as evidence and illustration.
He follows his original tendency to rely in every situation
largely on the evidence that is given in the natural realm. Here
ethics is largely concerned with the human individual and his
many earthly functions. This is not synonymous with intellect as
in Plato, but is concerned with happiness. Still the knowledge
of happiness can never be exact so this type of ethics is not
28 - Metaphysic
,
Bk. Ill, Ch. I, p. 182.
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nearly as well developed a science as Aristotle had considered 11
to he. Lotze seems to recognize both of these phases. He states
that there must be an ideal worked out by intellect and a consid*
eration of universals. But the practical application of many of
the ideals thus established must be considered on another level.
Then Lotze investigates the forms of approach to life that dif-
ferent individuals take. He conditions the program of ethics to
a very great extent on that consideration and yet never leaves
out the progress of the ideal as it runs through each particular
situation.
It is the interest of the Individual that has prime impor-
tance for Lotze, He sees that a man may be met in the vulnerable
region of the things that he is interested in and from there be
led to a point that may bring about a good. It is interest that
designates the success or failure of all things and ethics must
realize that feature if it is to become practical for the social
group or individual. But he recognizes the need and place for a
constant factor that will give some grounding to any social pro-
gress that is developed. Interest could not be completely free
for then it would become chaotic. He establishes both ground
and possibility of change by his definition of interest. "This
interest of our ideas, which constitutes their power, has a con-
29
stant element and a variable one." Thus in the logical develop-
ment which is best suited to both Idealism and realism in ethics
he finds that the joining point is interest, itself.
29 - Metaphysic, Bk. Ill, Ch. II. p. 225.
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The whole world of sense Impressions meets this dividing
line and is classified thereby. It is not that things in them-
selves are good or bad. It is the question as to whether they
are termed good or bad by our interest which when functioning
correctly considers both the ideal and the mitigating circum-
stances, Aristotle brings in the conditioning factors of plea-
sure and virtue along with others and establishes in scientific
consideration the same general method of ethics that Lotze does.
The difference again lies in the origin and guidance of the prin-
ciple. Aristotle takes it from a wide range of observable con-
ditions while Lotze centers it in the individual's mental delib-
eration and lets the conditions rotate around that point.
Because of the fact that Aristotle's thought is based on
the natural order as it appears to man he reacts strongly to the
expression of natural beauties. Although he does not stray off
into the sublimities as Plato often does he does find a response
that leads him to careful consideration of the fine arts. Here
also he and Lotze are often in agreement though Lotze sometimes
sees things in the expression of the beautiful that Aristotle
does not believe are there. To Aristotle the fine arts are an
imitation of nature and he is very critical of Plato's thought
that art is in reality a moral lesson. Aristotle sees art as
bringing out the reality that lies in nature though not always
apparent in the sense object itself. Then the purpose of art is
to put man into conformity with the values of nature by giving
him pleasure.
But art is a living experience. It is a creative venture
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on the part of individuals both in its creation and enjoyment.
In this respect it would involve a freedom that is necessary to
creativity. Nature does not have that freedom according to Lot-
ze. He saya that there is unlimited freedom of action involved
in the conception of the divine essence but the fixed course of
30
nature does not seem to bear any traces of that freedom. Here
Lotze moves closer to Plato as he sees the forms of art being
expressed in sense objects, but places the reality of that art
in another sphere which is an essence of divinity. Aristotle*
s
demand for dependence on nature in itself has made him lose
sight of the essence that is beyond nature though connected to
it.
Following this line of reasoning Aristotle relied on the
process of induction. He had no doubt but that the human mind
could apprehend the formal structure of the universe in its en-
tirety through the intuition of forms and categories. He felt
that complete knowledge of the universal was given with the per-
ception of particulars. It had to be some species of substance
and some kind of species. Yet this method could not take him
all the way. Lotze saw the fallibility of this type of approach
He doubted the absolute validity of this confinement to a formal
structure. He was constantly driven beyond it in investigation
and never felt completeness unless this added factor of the di-
vine essence was made a part of each situation.
Aristotle said that spirit is thought thinking itself. The
30 - Metaphysic, Bk. II, Ch. VIII, p. 138.
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approach here is that of including spirit within the cognitive
function of the mind. Lotze * s approach was one of lifting spirit
to a higher level and making it in a certain sense independent of
the mind though working in close collaboration.. The method that
they took was practically the same for both of them. Lotze had
the advantage of seeing a clearer metaphysical realm on which to
depend for his consideration of the natural while Aristotle in
his dealings with nature tended to go off at tangents in the
realm that both felt nature lead to, the metaphysical. Aristotle
had been driven by a lack in Plato to a separate ground of argu-
ment. Lotze was searching for a synthesis of the two in a more
organized form of the metaphysical and the natural.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SPAN
From the great tradition of these two men who were to influ-
ence philosophy in all its phases down through the ages to the
present day there was to be laid out a long and torturous path
for theism* Yet through all of the varied emphases that were to
be presented it was to rear its head time and time again, bloody
but unbowed. Plato and Aristotle died in 347 B.C. and 342 B.C.,
respectively, and Roman culture began to make Itself felt strong-*
upon the Greek mind until in 146 B.C. when the Roman domina-
tion became complete physically and the Roman influence led Greek
thought to a more practical emphasis. This was felt first in the
systems of the Epicureans and then that of the Stoics. The Epi-
cureans were related to Lotze in their theory of thoughtful plea-
sure. This emphasized the fact that men follow lines of activity
because of the pleasure derived from them and this pleasure is
well controlled so that many fine ends are realized. The begin-
nings of Lotzian psychology show that he realized the need for
such consideration.
The Stoics brought out an emphasis that Lotze made a centra]
feature of his thinking. This was the delight that men found in
themselves. The realization of their own capabilities gave them
new courage and stability in a fluctuating world. In Lotze it
was through the medium of selfhood that the character of divinity
was to be found. The opposition of the following sceptics to
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these assertions led to a new syncretism that drew together the
previously conflicting lines. Here the demand was for the par-
ticulars of science and a reacting distrust of the Occidental in-
fluence that had brought in suggestions on the mystical plane.
The worth of Christianity was upheld by the Gnostics espec-
ially as Christianity related Itself to nature and the physical
systems. The concept that nature was favorable to man’s develop-
ment was set up in contrast to the old law of an eye for an eye.
This was a definite suggestion of the presence of God working
through nature as Lotze conceived it. The contributions that
were later to find fuller expression in the Lotzian theory were
already beginning to mount up and the tracing of this gradual
accumulation is quite clear.
The Neo-Platonists were the next group to add to this col-
lection. They held to a position that was very close to Lotze
in stressing the ethical emphasis. They affirmed the thought
that the highest ethical aim is the apprehension of the divine.
This was the same thought that was to find pious expression in
the words of Augustine, to know God is the supreme good of life.
It is really the theme of all theistic philosophy and comes as
the name of the group implies from the contemplation of divine
ideals on the basis of the reality that Plato ascribed to them.
The fault of this theme is that there is a tendency for the
world to retreat into the background. Yet if the Lotzian empha-*
sis is given fiill expression it may be seen as a climax after
the values of the natural world have been fully considered as
helpful evidence and reflections of the divine mind. But these
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values are none the less real because of their subsidiary posit-
ion, subsidiary in that they are steps along the pathway to God
and each step must take its position in the graded scale.
The Church Fathers attempt to bring out the finest features
of both the Gnostics and the Neo-Platonists . They lead to an es-
tablished position that would be a norm for Christianity and in
order to do this they spent much of their time in refuting the
opposition that arose to the synthesis which they set up. Augus-
tine is one of this group and may be characterized as the great-
est bulwark of its strength and not only for this group but for
Christian philosophers for a thousand years from his time on.
He died in 430 A.D. The harm that was wrought by this obsession
for the will of God was a denial of the metaphysical freedom of
man and a reaction against the ways of physical activity. Again
the swing was too far to one side and Lotze's demand for know-
ledge of the physical was not to be found to any great extent
among these thinkers. Even the Gnostic point that nature was of
great value was ignored as they took other lesser points from
the Gnostic position.
Scholasticism came along to attempt to bridge the gap that
had been created between the spiritual and the physical. It
sought to bring the church that had been divorced from this world
back into the normal way of life. Albertus Magnus and Thomas
Aquinas set the standard and the attempt was made to make eccles-
iastical dogma accessible to natural understanding. Thomas
lived in the thirteenth century and there had been a long period
of relative stagnancy since Augustine. Consequently there had
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appeared many new problems that had to be faced. Part of the
task of scholasticism was to solve these. The procedure was to
bring rationality into separate doctrines and then give logical
arrangement to all so that they would fit into an over-all sys-
tem, This system attempted to bring a natural under standing to
the larger group of students in appropriating super sensuous ma-
terial. No matter what phase of activity a thinker adhered to
he might find himself in this general scheme in relation to all
other phases. Through it all definite steps were shown to rise
to a comprehension of dogma. If these steps were followed there
was room for all sciences and yet all led to the one truth of
faith in G-od. This corresponds in method with Lotze' s position.
There is the same wide sweep that he considers and also the de-
votion to the absolute divine principle.
The greatest difference is in the attitude of approach.
Scholasticism had its dogma already created and started from
that point to subjugate and organize all under that ultimate be-
lief. Lotze began with experience and the recognition of cul-
ture to reach a position where he could establish a fundamental
belief. The emphasis of both in dealing with the natural world
was Aristotelian. But since Thomas was bound to the authority
of the Roman Catholic church in dogma he could not be completely
open-minded in investigation as Lotze tried to be. He had to es*
tablish an indestructible position for the church. He did this
by separating faith and reason and allowing each to have its own
field of investigation. The dogma of the church was a matter of
revelation and thus faith. Therefore whenever faith came in con-
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flict with reason faith would, take precedence for that would mean
that reason had not found the truth in that particular situation,
In Lotze faith and reason were so intertwined that advancement in
each field led to a resulting progress in the other.
The position of Thomas was firmly established and was to con-
tinue even dov/n to the present day as the standard for many
thoughtful philosophers. But into the main stream of philosoph-
ic thought there came a great transition period that was later
to find itself involved in the universal movement of the Renais-
sance. This period was begun by a group who were known as Theo-
3ophists. They said that philosophy was divine wisdom. The at-
tempt was made to break the scholastic dualism and let all pro-
ceed systematically from the one source. Again the theme is
close to Lotze' s theism though the method is inadequate. The
Cosmosophists reacted by saying that philosophy is secular wis-
dom. Monism was yet maintained but the shift was made in regard
to source. The age-old problem persisted. How were thinkers to
explain the universe; through the spiritual or the physical?
The Thesophists took dogma back to the gospels and tried to
reconstruct it apart from the church on the basis of the thought
of the apostles. The root of the theory was in revelation from
G-od and there was a great similarity to the Barthians of the pre-
sent day. The Cosmosophists reawakened the systems of ancient
Greece with a particular emphasis on Aristotle. They brought
out the naturalistic and thus lesser side of Plato's thought to
develop their own position. Through all of these activities the
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span is being constantly strengthened by new cables that link
certain parts of it to one of the towers at each end. 3ut in
linking itself with one tower the result is that it must also
depend upon the other. Philosophy maintains its contact with
the past but it never ceases to look to the future.
Out of these movements also necessarily came theories that
met the contemporary situation. First there was the ecclesiasti-
cal political, next the non-ecclesiastical political and then
the naturalistic political. These all were directly expressive
of the manner in which the abstract theory could find practical
realization. Thus 3-od came to take a place in the civic life of
the day and this was especially true of the whole medieval per-
iod. Aristotelianism in the medieval sense was the dominant
theme through all of these philosophies beginning with scholas-
ticism. Yet they cut too sharply between worldliness and spir-
ituality and thus really lost Aristotle.
The break into modern philosophy tries to resolve this ex-
treme dualism. It puts man in contact with the world directly
and yet keeps his metaphysical contacts through an inner spirit-
ual life. Man is the central issue as he never had been before.
Principles now begin to rotate around him and the emphasis that
Lotze puts on personality is fully justified through this new
emphasis on the liberated spirit of the individual man.
Pantheism is the system that now becomes the criterion for
new thought. Descartes sets a standard that is later to be ac-
claimed again and again. He holds that mind is the key to all
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things. It has many different forms and effects, but they all
may be traced back to the one reality in mind which is found to
vary from the one mind of the universe only in the matter of de-
gree. Lotze follows this path rather closely while his main ob-
jection lies in the fact that Descartes does not ascribe enough
reality to the physical object. Malebranche counteracts Descar-
tes without leaving the pantheistic system by saying that the
key is body and all bodies are a modification of God. This puts
the emphasis too far in the other direction and yet tends to aid
in satisfying Lotze' s demand for the reality of the objective.
Spinoza took Descartes' theme, but said that individual ex-
istences were of the nature of substance which is God. This gave
a larger range to each individual instance in that the subjective
and the objective each had a small place in the existence and
substance was considered to cover both fields. This also touch-
ed on Lotze for lie wished to include both the subjective and the
objective. Yet it fell short because the concept of substance
was not broad and inclusive enough.
Realistic and idealistic systems rebelled against pantheism
and set up an opposite position to repeat the process of contro-
versy in these matters. Yet when these systems were carried all
the way through they are seen to be essentially atheistic and
thus cannot be counted as having a large connection with Lotze.
Their function though did in several minor instances use and
keep alive in discussion theories that he was later to use in a
different form. Realism had followed Aristotle and enlightened
the materialistic conceptions while idealism took after Plato
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and opened up a rationalistic explanation and expression of the
higher values of metaphysical reality.
The stream that included the philosophers of the world ob-
jected to the many one-sided theories that had been put forth
and were expressive of a sentiment that has always had a certain
vogue in the history of philosophy. These thinkers studied man
in his environment and it would have done Lotze 1 s heart good to
seek to unearth the solutions to man's personal problems. They
were very sceptical of recent previous thought and developed a
critical ability that was carried on by all philosophers of the
world in the future.
On top of this fine beginning there came a new emphasis tha
was extremely broad in its scope. The mediation of opposites
was attempted on a great scale and it was this attitude that Lot-
ze took. These groups did not go as far as he was later able to
go for the emphasis here was to deal with those theories that
were already established. The work of reconstruction had to be
gone through before there was a creative basis for further pro-
gress. Criticism was the general title for this group. The at-
tempt was to reach positions that could either be called real-
idealism or ideal-realism. The members used the past, but their
purpose was to criticize and thus transcend it. It was here
that Kant was to revolutionize philosophic thought simply by
critical analysis and suggestion though he never quite seemed
to reach a positive position in regard to theism. Still he laid
the ground for it and did all but declare it. He gave it intel-
lectual respectability in one sense for he considered philosophy
42
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to be the knowledge of rationalism and empiricism. His work was
mainly in analysis and not especially in positing new concepts
of the world order. He wanted to explain that which is. Al-
though Lotze did not always agree with him no man who followed
him could leave out the tremendous truths that he drew forth
from the world that men know through observation.
Kant had done excellent work in resolving Leibnitz and Locke,
but still he was largely on one side for his work merely added
up to an elaboration of natural science. He had not satisfied
the so-called faith philosophers and although he seems to have
tried to, he never would go far beyond his beloved empiricism.
Several opponents arose to attempt to compass the field of sub-
jectivity that Kant had not quite explained. Reinhold was the
leader here, but he merely succeeded in accentuating one side
without getting a complete answer. To consider the issues thus
raised along came the science of knowledge especially with Fich-
te and his expressions in both the theoretical and practical.
Schlegel and Schleiermacher take up the controversy from
opposite positions of feeling and the system of identity with
the latter upheld by Schleiermacher making the greater contribu-
tion. Schelling continued to bear the system of identity aloft
in the attempt to see things as eternal rather than the nothing-
ness of the temporal and spatial. The movement in opposition to
these successes was toward pantheism and then its opponent indi-
vidualism as Herbart and Schopenhauer took the center of the
stage. These two were mediated as pantheism and subjectivism
were reconciled. The themes that Lotze was particularly inter-
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ested in were being considered from many points of view and he
was later to take great advantage of the condensation afforded
by the conclusions to such widespread investigation.
Next Cosmosophy and Theosophy took the opposite sides of
another argument to keep alive the old issue and they were again
mediated, but through all of this the activity was on a very
critical basis. Hegel's panlogism declared that reason is everyA-
thing in an attempt to develop and clarify the system of identi-
ty and the science of knowledge. He set a standard in his logic
that was revered by his followers and his dialectic of thesis,
antithesis and synthesis reflected clearly the procedure that
had been foremost in recent history of philosophy.
There had been so much discussion between realism and ideal-
ism, individualism and pantheism, naturalism and theosophy and
an assimilation of these seeming opposites that after Hegel
there came a break in the continuation of such discussion. Phil-
osophers turned to opposing or defending the Hegelian position
but in a way that was constantly bringing out new theories and
thus getting further and further away from Hegel. Phenomena
were discussed in the metaphysical relationship of orderly sys-
tem, in the realm of religion bringing to bear the many ques-
tions that Hegel had suggested in regard to Christ, immortality
and theism, and in the fields of politics and the ethics of the
social order. As these grew away from Hegel they culminated in
a reconstruction program in which the whole history of philoso-
phy was reconsidered and adapted to use.
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As such systems were considered new truths about them were
revealed and they were developed along the lines that stood the
test of critical analysis.. Hegel fell, but the advancements
that he had made contributed to the development of a new group
that would not accept anything that was not fully justified by
experience and reason. This lead them to an even greater meta-
physics based on the solid grounds of science though never allow-
ing that science to confine the thought life of the individual.
The men in this group were many for it was a golden age for phil-
osophy. This perhaps partly accounts for the fact that even the
greatest of them have sometimes been lost to view by the genera-
tions of philosophers who were to succeed them. Their pupils
were small in number to each individual teacher and only two or
three have been able to come forth from them to make a lasting
impression on the minds of our day. Eowne was along with Ladd
one of the chief ones of Lotze’s pupils to fulfill this function
for him.
Lotze was at the climax of this group. He was stimulated by
contacts with brilliant contemporaries in his own land where
most of these men were located and he benefited from studies
that had brought the past into living reality. His position in
the history of philosophy was extremely advantageous and his wil-
lingness to learn from the past was the height of academic humil-
ity. To this he added a visionary yet practical mind.
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CHAPTER V
GOD AND NATURE
The moat striking feature of Lotze’s view of nature is its
strict adherence to mechanism. Thus he begins by hitting the
leading argument of his opponents and taking that argument into
his own position to use it as an important accessory to his the-
ism. As he says, '’perhaps also it will at last appear that
mechanism as a whole, far from being antagonistic to the true
tasks of mental life, has itself been taken as a necessary work-
ing element in the great totality of things of which only par-
tial glimpses of separate sides are afforded to the human mind
31
by the fluctuations of the spirit of the age". He uses it but
makes it a subsidiary attribute and thus merely a part of the
whole. At the same time he wishes the fact made clear in the
mind of his reader that mechanism is not as purely simple as
many consider it to be and that the real scientist recognizes
this fact of variableness and fluctuation. The law is universal,
but the many forms of interpretation of that law may bring one
to quite divergent points of view.
The rule of effeciency is a very strong one, yet even effe-
ciency is often tempered by conditioning circumstances. Lotze
discusses the theory of atoms in an advanced manner and then
brings out the points of speculation regarding them that may
31 - Mlcroco smus
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lead to an opening of a new world that had not been considered
up until the time that such discovery was made. Finally it ap-
pears that no mechanistic theory can be absolute for it is one
of the considerations of the field of knowledge and absolute
knowledge is untenable.
This investigation drives him back to a recognition of the
inner nature of things and the fact that all outer connections
spring from this inner life of the thing that is the expression
of a great state of movement. It is on this peg of thought,
that expressions come from within the individual elements, that
Lotze later hangs his argument for metaphysics. He shows that
the mechanistic view of nature demands metaphysics for its ex-
planation, There is a comprehensive unity to all seemingly di-
vergent forces which never denies the validity of physical
science, but rather affirms it. The laws of nature determine
the results and weld them together into a world, but there is a
presupposition of the relation of elements on which the succeed-
ing results depend.
The law of nature is a mere by-law of the intelligence or
expression of the intrinsic activity of a thing. Immanent oper-
ation in things is an ultimate fact. The action of one thing on
another cannot be explained by the transition of a state or mood
It must go back to the original source. No law can compel one
element to change because another does,. And yet it can't be
known how absolute unity is also many. "We think we know what
water is, what mercury is, and yet we can assign to neither con-
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.
stant properties belonging to it, apart from all external condi-
32
tions.” Yet the question as to what things are is not so diffi-
cult. They manifest the properties that are within them even
though we may sense them in many various states. The great
problem of nature seems to be as to how they can exist and can
manifest themselves as they do. All of nature constantly leads
us to this problem and here physical science limits itself with-
out trying to cross the boundaries that the question, what, sets
up.
In the realm of the "what” Lotze finds that there is quite
adequate investigation as far as method is concerned. The body
of scientifically precise laws is concerned with governing the
motion of matter. He suggests that this is related to another
area in parallel fashion for there are also a number of empiric
observations that tend to govern or explain psychic manifesta-
tions. But in the third and higher realm we lack very decidedly
any scientific observance. Here it is that we need to discover
’’the laws that govern the states of being in general, from which
the science of physical nature and that of mental life should
flow as two different applications of a common underlying prln-
33
ciple”
.
The way to discover this is through the unity of the soul
which is the identity of the perceiving subject. It is here
that all impressions from various parts of the external world
and from various periods of time are collected. It is the nar-
32 - Microcosmus
.
Bk. II, p. 189.
33 - Microcosmus . Bk. II, p. 195.
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row doorway that opens into a realm unbelievably large in its
scope. It is an investigator rather than an originator. Thus
it prepares the way for the intuitions of time and space as they
are brought about by the process of the mind which unites and re-
lates action expressed by the mutual relations of impressions.
In order to understand this process of nature we must stop and
gather into one undivided act of knowledge the past and present
members of the series and survey all their mutual relationships
at once. As it is considered in time, so in space. We gather
the existing order of the external world and translate it into
one complete concept that is immediately all revealing of the
properties of space. The cognitive energy of the individual
thus evolves the relations of impressions in space and time after
receiving the impressions. It is an active work and not simply
a receptive acceptance.
It is not the mere presence of images that is involved. It
must go beyond products of the mechanical course of ideas. Con-
cepts are gained only after the thought process of the individ-
ual refers the content that he has obtained to its corresponding
universal. The universal may be depended upon for reference for
the content that is gained from images is a coherent whole since
it reflects the indivisible meaning of that of which it is the
image. The universal and the meaning behind the image are
brought into collaboration and harmony through the activity of
the mind. Since the soul is able to find this material on both
sides, the mental and the physical, to be of like nature it fol-
lows that there is a unity from which both proceed on the basis
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of the aforementioned underlying principle.
The question of body and mind relationship has always been
one of prime importance in philosophy. Lotze considers that the
attempts which have been made to set up a mediating factor are
false for they simply add to the confusion with a third element.
He states that neither one has control over or is able to init-
iate the other. The degree of their relationship which is so
coordinated that it almost approaches identity at times is deter-
mined by an inner characteristic of each which in its appearance
is independent of the other. It is only as the independent
force begins to assert itself that it is discovered that it con-
forms harmoniously to the independent force of the other. Once
again we are led to the consideration of a unity behind the two
instead of the third factor. Every concept of the order of na-
ture and its relationship to the mental process leads to the
fundamental base of theism or at least the conditions for theism.
From that point on the procedure is one of establishing through
investigation the laws that govern states of being.
The soul originates in itself a series of inner states and
it is these that nature makes the starting-points of movements.
Likewise the forms of the body are finally fixed or prepared at
a period prior to the unfolding of these mental activities. The
significant fact is that the mind is able to understand the body
and can depend upon the harmony that exists between the mental
realm and nature. The fact that the two can know each other at
all is revealing of a previous unity beyond the area of our in-
vestigation as to scientific proof. But this does lead to a
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closer investigation of nature. Here Lotze suggests a different
Interpretation of the matter of nature. Whereas it is generally
accepted that matter consists merely of that which we sense he
says that it has two forms of existence. The first is the nor-
mal one that it has an outward form in accordance with the well-
known physical properties, but the second is that it is inwardly
34
stirred by mental activity. Here is the mind of nature that ex-
plains so many seemingly unexplainable problems of nature. How
could nature be so well adapted and arranged unless it were
based upon an intellect.
It is an internal systematization of homogeneous masses that
is often quite apparent to the senses, but is not always direct-
ly connected with them. Matter cannot be completely explained
as a ttwhat H . It requires something more to justify the position
and action that it takes. It is not extension in space that is
the answer to a consideration of nature matter, but rather the
realization that it is but a veil of an infinite realm of mental
life. We may think of each atom or unit of matter as the seat
of a peculiar mental energy. Yet this does not mean that it is
synonymous with our thought. It always remains separate and
preserves its individuality.
Lotze was quite willing to accept the normal picture of na-
ture. He held that the natural conception of the universe which
finds the course of the world only intelligible of a multiplic-
ity of persistent things, of variable relations between them,
51 .
34 - Microcosmus, Bk. Ill, p. 354.
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35
and of events arising out of these changes of mutual relation.
This point concerning the picture of nature as it is revealed to
our senses should not be confused with the idea of an inner life
within the thing. The two are both possible and in fact are de-
pendent upon each other. There is nothing mysterious about this
It is merely an exposition of that which is. All the logic of
the mechanistic position may also be used in Lotze’s view. The
difference lies in the fact that he goes through the mechanistic
interpretation to a larger and more satisfying conception.
It also cannot be said of Lotze*s view that this continual
reversion to the one source of things hints at complete deter-
minism. Such could not possibly be the case as it is in the
"substance" of Leibnitz for it is mind that is behind Lotze’s
position and all the unlimited possibilities of mind are open to
a nature that is understood in this manner. Thus Lotze is care-
ful to keep questions in the realm in which they belong. The
problem of determining principles and what gives them their
power to determine is that of metaphysics. Evolution rests on
this. But it is also apparent in evolution that particular ob-
jective laws are in action and this is the question of physical
science. The workers in science drive themselves to such a con-
sideration of the way that organic life is derived that they in-
fest the words; matter, mechanism and accident with the meanings
that others have for spirit, life and providence and the two be-
36
come almost synonymous.
35 *• Metaphysic. Bk. I. p. 29.
36 - Metaphysic. Bk. II, p. 158.
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Continually we seek in discussion a cause which is the one
cause of the universe. Yet as the arguments develop a unity of
all things it is difficult to keep away from the conception that
everything is simply a phase of the one substance. Lotze strives
continually to keep away from that position and succeeds again
and again as particular instances are brought into the discus-
sion. After all things have been considered he still wants it
made clear that the one did not in a thousand times appear a
thousand times, but rather brought together the thousand forms
of its existence into the unity of a single development, in
37
which each stage is a condition of the next. The position which
holds that things are characterized on a substance basis as it
is related to forms which we perceive must not be confused with
the position that finds things accessible to one great mind
which is able to comprehend all things, not only matter but also
ideas, even as we are able to comprehend our limited scope.
Even the most advanced philosophers find it difficult to
believe in the existence of anything beyond the experience of
the senses and in their emphasis on the senses they become tied
down and limited to them. Lotze never denied their validity and
their place in the problem of knowledge, but he used tnem as a
factor in a larger whole. The psychologist especially gives in-
timations of this larger realm, but even he is largely tied down
by the physical world and fits in with the efforts of others
such as the biologist, astronomer and physicist. Lotze wants
37 “ Mlcrocosmus , Bk. IV, p. 454.
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all of these to fit into their respective places, but he does
not want to be limited to them. The world of nature is of value
just so long as it can tell men about themselves and the minds
which they have. Always nature leads to something beyond itself
The mere fact of its existence asserts that fact and it is the
theistic philosopher's job to follow through wherever it is pos-
sible for him to make reasonable and logical deductions.
The world of sense or objectivity as we see it is entirely
insufficient. It deals only with itself and cannot possibly an-
swer any of the questions that concern its reason for being.
Since it is a completely contained thing there is no opposition
feature to establish its validity and value for that which we
know as mind. To set mind behind and within it gives the world
of nature a sounding board and a reason for existence as well as
the proof of such existence. The cosmological approach is
rather a fine measure of argument in the face of the nature that
is presented to us. Conditioned beings and events exist and pre-
sume an unconditioned and necessary first principle. To deal
with the first is to deal with God. Unconditional is merely ac-
tual and its recognition will be necessity for us though not in
itself necessary. The quality of mind is never lacking and all
response is on the basis that mind does exist for the thing that
38
responds.
The question is raised as to whether the absolute one can
be identified with the God of religion. Materialism identifies
38 - Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion.
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it with matter, but wants matter to remain constant. Lotze as-
serts that this can be done only by a conscious spirit. Even if
matter could be many-in-one, it could not generate consciousness.
When the turn is made to idealism which takes matter up into
mind there is a more adequate explanation, but still this is not
sufficient. There is nothing in these properties of matter to
compel us to assume, as the subject of which they are predicated,
something in opposition to the reality of spirit. Space is pure-
ly mental appearance engendered in us by mehtal agencies which
are not spatial. Space is really in us, not we in space. Ma-
terial forces express inner nature which may well be spiritual.
Thus there is mind outside of us as well as outside the world of
nature which contacts our minds and makes it possible for us to
perceive this world of nature which is other than ourselves. It
is on this basis that the world of nature assumes relationship
to something other than itself and thus Justifies itself.
In our particular case as human it is an unconsciousness of
self that is our limitation and this must not be ascribed to the
ultimate Real. This point will be developed in the next two
chapters particularly, but it has the most direct relationship
to our world of nature. Men and nature are involved in the
whole unitary structure and consideration is on the basis that
each, though a separate expression, is proceeding from the same
source. There are various ways of developing the central posi-
tion, but they all lead to the One taking in different bits of
evidence as they make their way along.
.
J ' v ,
,
.
.
Q. Hi < 7 **« .'Jam
,
?
• .
:
.s
• .- •
.
. ,
~
/
.
,
,
=
• L : . / - j 9 taiuo i t L
,
• n . oiOc.no am; ur. •- i J t n - 1 a^s .
v ,» t . -1
'
•
:
: •: ' •••--.- -0 •
»
-
*
'
.
->
- «
-
.
.
i\
The ontological view is a cautious one and here Lotze shows
his desire to be fair to all aspects. He asserts that what can
be implied is not necessarily so. The factor might be an event
or order as well as being as it relates itself to the nature
ground. But still the predominant emphasis shows an impulse
toward the supersensuous
,
though it cannot be considered a log-
ical conclusion based on positive premises. The accidental view
illustrates a side result as an accident and thus a not-necessary
factor of fulfillment. But apart from this drift in justifica-
tion it is necessary. Behind all finally comes the ultimate
event or mere matter of fact which is not necessary except in
admission by us. Eventually it is discovered that it cannot
stand alone, but must depend upon mind to accept it. Thus the
cosmological leads to a pluralistic view of science. Religious-
ly it leads to the thought of one supreme Principle to govern
and create duality in order that the mind may even know and ac-
cept the object.
Finally bare action sets up some definite conclusions that
cannot be avoided. There is matter of fact which is eternal and
real without deriving from anything else. Man may regard this
through experience. There are an undefinable number of real el-
ements with real motion and then finally the reassertion that
the laws of nature determine results from the relation of ele-
ments and weld them together into a world. To all of this a
perfectly definite result always comes for every series is stati§
Action leads always to a cause and result of such. The ensuing
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result are found in that which is beyond the matter in**
the action. Matter thus leads to G-od and nature is of
I
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CHAPTER VI
GOD AND LIFE
Here the expression is put on a slightly different basis
from that in the preceding chapter. Life cannot especially be
termed as on a higher level. Rather it might be said that it is
a bit closer to the central unifying factor than nature although
nature is just as truly an expression of it. Life is fused into
all things. It is an attribute of nature as well as of man and
is in many respects the thing that ties together all the dis-
tinctive factors of this harmonious existence of the universe.
God makes direct expression through the faculties of life though
these expressions or the results of them may be best perceived
in the characteristics of nature.
Through life the soul of man may have its effect upon the
forces of nature and vice versa. An atom of the nervous system
may exert an impact and pressure on the soul, or the soul on it,
since closer scrutiny discovers ordinary impact and pressure to
be not a means to the effect, but only the perceptible form of a
39
far more subtle process between the elements. Thus the soul has
within it all the possibilities of the effects in nature and
life is the link that brings the two together. All bodily im-~
pressions are strokes for the soul which draw forth from its own
nature the internal phenomena of sensation. Life is the dynamic
39 - Microcosmus . Bk. Ill, p. 281.
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element that makes motion possible and a smoothly interflowing
process between mind and nature. As movement is carried out it
is discovered that this movement is merely a development of pur-
posive relations that are not devised by the soul, but are
blindly initiated by it since the conditions are already present
both in the soul and the realm of nature of which the body is a
part. We have said that life is closer to the center than na-
ture in order to make an attempt at classification and a resul-
tant clearer understanding. Lotze says that it is possible to
cut through all gradation though this does not especially deny
classification. Yet he is trying to make clear the fact that
this is a circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumfer-
ence is nowhere. Thus he can "conceive a being not merely, in
some relation to all the rest of the universe, but to every part
40
of it in an equally close and gradationless relation".
Life is a concept that transcends all physical limitations
that we know and thus is an open door to our minds to understand
what Lotze means to say. It is the feature that is all inclu-
sive and beyond which we really need no other if we will give it
its most comprehensive scope. It is really the dynamic force.
The individual person finds that in order to perceive he must
possess in the constitution of his nature a compulsion, a capac-
ity and an impulse to form conceptions and to move the manifold
content of his sensation in this kind of combining together and
drawing asunder. Philosophy may go beyond to a higher reason
40 - Microcosmus
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for this but it is life that is the direct expression of it and
life that proceeds from the higher reason thus considered.
Physical science traces these functions and interactions of
the life of different things and finds merely a causal chain of
processes. We tend to Investigate and rate the importance of
things in regard to the extent that they conform to the accuracy
of this chain. Yet in all of this we are determining for our
minds that accuracy of the faculties of life and giving it more
and more responsibility in the so-called practical realm. As we
do this we simply drive our evidence back to the justification
of the source of life and even physical science tends to reach
beyond itself for its own explanation.
But life does not always explain these factors of nature as
in physical science. It leads to other considerations that are
not at all involved in extension as of space. It must be ac-
knowledged ’’that extension can no more be the predicate of a
being than an eddy or vortex is the mode of motion of a single
element; both alike can be conceived only as forms of relation
41
between many elements”. Thus in considering unextended atoms as
a possibility there is opened the way through physical science
to the concept of an inner mental life pervading all matter.
The one factor of physical science is an expression of life, but
the range of life also reaches into all the fields of ideas that
are expressed in the mental life.
The question of life always leads to the question of con-
I
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sciousneas and in Lotze it is difficult to discover any direct
feature of distinction between consciousness and knowledge. As
he does not differentiate clearly here there is the suggestion
that consciousness and knowledge must be mutually existent if
either is to find expression. Certainly they are very closely
related and thus Lotze follows the idea of Kant that all know-
ledge of other than self is impossible. Here the key to know-
ledge is self and the possibility of knowledge is determined by
the degree to which the self can express the universe, which to
Lotze is complete expression. There is reference in this point
also to the G-reek expression, know thyself. Through this one
could come to a final possession of that which was required in an
interpretation not only of physical science but also of ethics
and all things that were created by thought structure.
As the self expresses itself through motion it does so to a
different degree than other features of life do. This activity
of life is worked out and expressed on various levels. This Lot*
ze characterizes by a central control as he states that "every
finite thing, therefore, possesses the capability of action only
in such amount and such quality as it is permitted by the Infin-
42
ite to contribute to the realization of the whole". All direc-
tion is always from the one source and life is the expressive
form of such direction. The thing that makes the self into an
individualistic form is the soul. Lotze feels that it is of
eternal and imperishable duration and as such is a definite sub-
42 - Mlcrocosmus
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ject. Thus it acts as distinctive and creative though still a
part of the larger whole. It is on this point that strong per-
sonal! stic theories are later to hang their argument. They take
this suggestion of Lotze's and develop it far beyond any posi-
tion that he gave it. Yet he made a place for it and room for
such development and to see this is to realize its importance in
the theistic view. We can never say that Lotze is a final au-
thority, but certainly it is true that he did a brilliant Job
with what he had and made possible even more clearly than ever
had been done before the conditions for advancement along this
line.
Every physical process that takes place between two elements
is linked to the mental by life and is an event within the Eter-
nal, on whose constant presence all possibility of action de-
pends. Thus the slightest movement within the organic structure
is a development of the Infinite himself. Carried out to the
higher level of the soul it may then be considered that the soul
does not originate in the body or anything else, but rather it
goes forth from the substance of the Infinite with no less full-
ness of reality than all actual nature brought forth from the
43
same source. We are overwhelmed and astounded by the numberless
!
ways of God. His creative hand is everywhere and his work re-
sults in the orderly and progressive practices with which we are
familiar. Growth is an essential to life and it is through that
method that value finds its place especially for the self. We
may follow the direction of these ways and approximate the truth
43 • Microcosmus, Bk. Ill, p. 391 .
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of certain theories. But Just as we are limited to an incomplete
knowledge of natural phenomena so we are limited in our study of
the spiritual order of the universe.
When we come to an impasse we must turn to the coworking
(Mitwlrkung ) of God and depend on the eternal action and reaction
between God and nature of which our bodies and thus a large part
of our investigation are a part. We cannot study life as though
it were complete in itself as dissevered from the divine energy.
We must consider it not only in the sphere that we recognize, but
also as being effected sympathetically according to regulative
principles by this coworking of God. This is the understanding
by which vitality is injected into nature in our thinking to be-
come essential to the whole view. It is the realization that the
very simplest beings are filled with life. Thus the combination
of these beings which result in the outward form of lifeless mat-1
ter is merely an expression of this seat of an inner life capable
of entering with the most varied forms of feeling into the pecul-^
iarity of every situation into which the changeful course of na-
ture threw them, or in which a more persistent process of growth
44
retained them.
The attempt is made primarily in this excursion into life to
explore the sphere of means rather than that of ends. The way of
procedure is through conscious sensation in order that discovery
may be made of the true action of continuously more intelligent
life. Thus the mechanistic expression of life in the forms that
63 *
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we observe it is the collection of all the instrumental forms in
which G-od has willed that created beings shall act on one another
with their unknown natures, and that all their states shall be
welded into the endless chain of a world history* The link of
life thus makes it complete. It satisfies both the requirements
of physical science and metaphysics. Nowhere is mechanism the
essence of the matter; but nowhere does being assume another form
of finite existence except through it; as we have not other gods
beside G-od, so we need no other form beside this universal form
45
of action in nature.
The purpose of life is to carry through in interpretation
the great real world which we know and to do so in such a way
that it is merely a reflection of the little world with all var-
iations and kinds considered. This little world is the Microcosm
and it is on this that the system of Lotze is developed. Man
himself is a reflection of this fundamental nature of the uni-
verse and different forms of it are carried into all phases of
the universe so that it finally reflects the whole in every par-
ticular instance. From this one seed of reality do all things
come and in such a way that they follow the course of life and
are expressed with its vitality. Lotze builds on the fragment of
unity that is all inclusive and adaptible to every form. As life
is the agent of activity so the minuteness may become an entire-
ty.
Lotze further moves to a discussion of life in the social
45 « Microcosmus , Bk. Ill, p. 400.
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sphere. He raises the problems of the me"tho<Is ”of culture and
how it developed from nature. But this discussion centers
around the home which is the root of man’s physical existence.
The pastoral mode of life brings conditions that are the most
favorable to the development of fine living and it is the home
that makes possible in man's mind the possession of his environ-
ment on a spiritual plane. He is at home mentally as well as
physically and his life moves with a steady purpose. The spirit-
ual life is brought down to earth and begins to live in each lo-
cal situation. Moral relations become practical and are essen-
tial to the well-being of the members of home relationship. Ev-
cry career though it may find its widest expression outside the
home environment takes the home as its base of operations and
finds the consummation of that career in the development of home
life. Sociologically the home has a strong effect particularly
in regard to the physical environment and spiritually it is the
strongest tie that man knows in the realm of personalities.
i
An individual has to feel that he fits in somev/here in the
whole sociological process that is set in motion by the home and
then includes the institutions that are imposed upon the home.
When he realizes that he is part of this unbroken stream of hu-
manity in the world's history he is stirred to activity in its
behalf and thus progress results. This is not only true of the
conscious realization that he has but also of the necessity that
is brought about by such conditions. The individual is confront-*
ed with responsibility and conditions that might almost be con-
sidered on a mechanical level although the same causes do not
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always produce the same effects. Yet as the conditions follow
the same general rule for all they become a part of a larger plan
that includes both the realm of nature and that of man’s rela-
tionships.
Lotze takes up another aspect of life as he moves from the
social sphere to the inner life. Here he finds a certain degree
of confusion particularly in regard to the long range problems.
In small situations individuals may be said to follow more or
less of a pattern, but when it comes t o the great aims and pur-
poses that drive them there is quite a degree of difference es-
pecially when individuals have not taken the time to think
through these larger goals. Doubts are raised as to the place of
such goals and purposes. As man is generally regarded he is
merely a transitory natural product and to dwell on greater ends
is to waste time. Lotze argues this out and discovers that into
the orderly progression of the natural life of man come many
stimulating and unexpected insights that bring about spontaneous
Judgments. As these are made and reflections follow there comes
another level of consideration. This goes beyond the natural and
looks to a supersensuous world that will provide for the result-
ing ideas that cannot be included in the natural realm.
Although at first we tend to see man as merely a product of
nature/s mechanism if we follow out this procedure of trying to
see things as a unity yet we soon realize that man is not pro-
duced by nature’s process. Reality lies in the unity that pro-
duces both man and nature in such a way that they are to a large
extent parallel and interrelated. We realize that laws alone
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never in any case produce a real being; they produce such only by
means of a preexistent real, actual, manifold, and primary which
46
subordinates itself and its working to these laws. The effects
and laws are both dependent on this real which is reflected in
every being.
Ultimately the final, the most comprehensive and the funda-
mental fact of reality is the unity and inner coherence of crea-
tive nature, which did not throw into that realm of necessary
laws an unconnected multitude of examples but rather the hidden
r
germ of an ordered world expressed through life that the laws
might develop it. The principle is one of separation in order
that the real may be a workable force in each incident and at
the same time an independent entity. As Lotze says, "it is this
47
living reality that has been the subject of our consideration".
In this he has tried to find man and his special nature as con-
trasted with the equally special natures of other beings. But
in this study there have been encountered many things within the
human creature that are not first produced in him. They reflect
another reality. When the attempt is made to connect the whole
of human nature with the whole of reality great difficulty is en-
countered.
Human nature is at the head of an animal world on a planet
in space. Here we are divided mentally from this animal world
by a seemingly insurmountable barrier. We follow great plans
46 - Mlcrocosmus
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and ideas that lead us out beyond our early reckonings, but then
we are constantly falling short of the ideals discovered. We are
perplexed by an inability to understand that which is often inti-
mated to us, but then Lotze has a suggestion for this also. "We
know not what there is hidden from us in the countless stars
which touch our lives only when a ray from them reaches our eyes
by night; how then should we know our place in the whole great
48
universe, with only a fraction of which we are acquainted?" The
I
j
only reasonable way out of this seeming incongruity is a study
,
of history and the connection of ideas that has gradually been
attained by the intellectual labor of the human race. Through
this process Lotze attempts to unite the scattered threads of re-
flection and reconcile many apparent contradictions.
In all of these processes of life Lotze admits the place of
the teleological. It is a system of means adapted to ends. He
asserts that the adaptation is proof of the wisdom of a personal
supreme Being who sustains the world. Others would use this
same point to prove opposing arguments. They grant that the re-
lation between an effect and the sum of the causes that actually
bring it to pass is invariably that of a nicely adjusted system
of means to its end. They see merely completeness in the mechan-
ical order and there rest content. The question, why, does not
seem to concern them. Yet how can we state that such an end is
sought after?
Design cannot be proved by the analysis of any combination
—— »« « «»m tm m
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whatever of actual facts. The question is; was there choice
which is essential to design? The suggestion then is that per-
haps the ultimate Reality is entitled in its original character
to predicates of harmony, inner agreement and adjustment of mean
to ends. When things destroy each other they oppose this view
and suggest merely a polytheistic view of different purposes.
Yet teleology accepts the ordinary view of science which holds
49
to the reality of givon elements, forces and laws. This also
though not completely solvent by logical arguments is adequate
to the purpose of the whole view of life which leads always to
God for its ultimate source.
49 - Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion .
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CHAPTER VII
GOD AND MAN
Whereas we have been discussing largely the character of the
physical world and the way that it is related to God and to man
now we come to the discussion of man as distinct from the physi-
cal world although never completely detached from it. It is nec-
essary of course to see and understand man through his physical
body yet his capacity for mental development is the primary fea-
ture of this physical creature and all discussion will be under-
taken with that in mind. Lotze spends many pages in discussing
man in the animal realm. He considers the Darwinian theory and
moves from brute to man as he sees symbolism and beauty of form
appear to a continuously more advanced degree. In this discus-
sion under the title of man we will also consider and primarily
so Lotze’ s section on mind.. It is man as thinker that we would
know for here it is that we get closest to God. We have God in
nature, but we take another step in His direction when we consi-
der God in mind.
The emphasis is on the idea in the soul of a man that grows
and expands into the variety of manifold activities which are its
natural results. We are not trying to get outside the normal
realm which we have been discussing but rather we are trying to
find the creative agency that works within that realm. To dis-
cover the beginning of its existence is impossible. Lotze says
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that we must regard existence as a precipitate. Its genesis
never can be understood but we can come to know it through our
ideas as they relate themselves to the ultimate Idea. Thus the
real is the Idea embodied in a manner which we cannot understand
in the form of H efficacious substantial ityH „ To seek this Idea
through ourselves is our purpose.
Man has the ability to unite and regulate a complexus of
action, passion and reaction. He is creative in this activity as
no other form of mental life known to us. He produces a thought-
image in which he is able to reproduce the content of things.
This is possible since that content is one expression of the term
idea while the form of the thought-image is the other. The
double meaning of idea is carried through on the basis that there
is a permanent identical meaning that can be expressed in a
boundless variety. Unity is still the keynote to this whole sys-
tem of thought.
Yet mind is far more than thinking. There are some things
that are intelligible only to the one who has experienced them.
They cannot be justified or originated by thought. They stand
alone as intimations of that which is just beyond comprehension
and yet they have a reality all their own and it fits in with the
reality of the whole. We find that we cannot express them, but
surely we can know them ourselves. These considerations lead to
the realization of individuality. At some point every person
stands completely alone and to a certain degree this may also be
50 - Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 548.
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gaid of every animal mind. Each one is a vitally active complete
idea which is distinct from every other and a perfect unit in it-
self, But Lotze attempts to show how man is not merely a higher
stage of animal life, but a distinct psychic life that exists in
a purely Independent relationship to God. That is, it is inde-
pendent of the rest of the world, but no thing can be independent
of God by the very nature of the fact of existence.
Man as he takes in sensation is not merely indif ferently
yielding a definite content to perception. Attached to each sen«r
sation is an element of feeling which measures in terms of pain
and pleasure the value of the stimulation received for our indi-
vidual existence. It is this distinct ability that mind has
which in a more intensified degree leads to the creativeness of
mental life. Creativity then is the mark of that which is other
than external nature or inner nature. Our most satisfactory
knowledge of this then must come through ourselves.
We gradually come to the realization that man is purposely
fitted for reaction that follows the general pattern. He comes
to distinguish between the true and the untrue as they are re-
lated to the ultimate Truth. Here again as he carries out the
almost instinctive processes he is following a line that has a
correspondence with mechanical action and yet cannot be produced
by that which we know outwardly as mechanical action. The realm
of the physical sciences is a guide to our thinking and yet it
cannot be made a substitute for thought. The realization is once
more upon us that we are working in the same general way as the
forces of the physical world, having come from the same source,
72 ,
*-
,
,
.
. io >
-
-
'
r
‘
'
....
,
,
.
,
„
.V :: : '
*
.
.
,
and yet we are distinctively different as we approach the very na
ture of thi3 source*
Once it is understood that man is available to Truth in the
primary Instance, then it follows that afterwards he is aroused
by experience to search for and discover individual truths* He
finds himself and begins a process that leads to maturity and
wisdom* Now he attempts to find definite reasons for this thing
that he has already experienced. The emphases of culture become
;
real to him and he tries to relate the beauty of the particular
to the wonder of the whole. But in this process man often com-
mits one of his greatest errors. He looks for an external cause
when there is no need for one. The inner cause is by far the
more real and it needs no elaborate explanation for ordinary
usage. Of course it baffles when the attempt is made to explain
it completely and yet it is the most positive thing that man may
know.
A distinct feature of man’s nature is his progressiveness.
He is adaptible to the highest concept of growth. Not only does
the organism continue to develop along physical lines, but the
relationship between organisms and minds is furthered and heightMl
ened by man’s ability to find for himself and for others ways of
living that lead to individual happiness and a greater degree of
universal fellowship. Although we may question many of the par-
ticular instances that arise we must admit the development over
a long period. Once we have seen this also the particulars be-
gin to have meaning for this longer view. Man finds that he
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must continually conform more adequately to the laws of the uni-
verse both physical and moral. As he conforms and becomes more
adaptible he finds more valid propositions that once more lead
him on the pathway to truth.
There is never the purpose on the part of Lotze to deny man
his freedom. It is only as man exercises his fullest prerogative
in the matter of choice that he comes to realize his own poten-
tialities and how close they are to the image of God in which he
was made. Choice develops character and responsibility in the
mind as the mind is trained in choice, Tnere could be no train-
ing and no growth if the issue of freedom were omitted, Man’s
body grows under the laws of the physical world while man’s mind
grows under the laws of freedom. Each of these two phases has a
process of mechanism which is rather limited in the former, but
finds the widest possible range in the latter.
It is essential as we have discussed before that man's men-
tal life conform in many respects to the physical world. They
both have the same source and there exists a certain parallelism
and interaction between the two. Thus there appear in man's
mind certain generic notions that make it possible for him to un-*
derstand the cosmos since the notions in his conception and the
principles which are the cosmos are one and the same. This is
not a complete function in that it is given over completely to
the mind. It is rather a system of growth and achievement that
may never result in completeness and yet has eternal purposes
and values that may be partially understood. But eventually it
is based on a few principles which can be regarded as truths
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that originally belonged to the mind as truths. These are devel-
oped so early and so invariably in every mind that all other
knowledge is acquired by their help and their influence. They do
not necessarily appear out of what we would consider as nowhere.
They are responses to environment and the resulting sensation in
such a way that nature and the bodily function is also necessary
to them. That is, they are products of the mind of God both
through the mind of man and nature.
As man continually reflects on these characteristics and
abilities that he has he comes to this realization that they come
from a source that is greater than he. He obtains insights into
that which he already has and he reinterprets in an objective
manner his innermost qualities. Gradually as he catches scat-
tered visions of truth and comes to realize that they tend to fit
together there arises in him the dawn of a knowledge of Truth.
As Lotze says, ’’this dawn may grow to a fuller day under favor-
51
able conditions"
. In order to bring in the day certain condi-
tions must exist. The individual must be satisfied in regard to
the fundamental bases of existence and then he must go on to a
desire for the enrichment of life through beauty. When these
things are cared for there is opportunity for the quiet impulse
of investigation to work. The person begins to lose himself in
the course of events in order that he may discover to some extent
where they lead to. He becomes conscious of the comprehensive-
ness and inevitableness of the network of relations which em-
51 - Mlcrocosmus
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braces all things.
The area of proof is definitely broadened and we see how it
may range far from its starting point. Though the road which our
thought takes is different from that along which the event tra-
vels we discover that the two always converge. It soon appears
to us that in the objective and thought-realized world the con-
nection between all parts of the world is so intimate that every
point may be reached from every other in a thousand ways, the don
52
minion of this all-pervading connection being nowhere interrupted
Of course it is also realized that this connection does not ex-
tend to human culture. That is far more blundering and error-
stricken and expresses growth in the adaptibility of mind which
is characterized by choice. However certain general rules still
may be applied in such a way that they reveal a degree of connect
tion and conformity and thought as it reaches out for understands
ing is really going back to its fundamental origin and source of
creativity. The distinction is that now it is approaching this
with an independent thought structure built on struggle for un-
der standing.
Upon the basis of all this connection we build a world of
joy or sorrow and here we are introduced to a level of expression
that is far more flexible and intensified. Things are judged
much more upon this basis. The consideration of happiness is
brought to bear and we find that all the other developments that
have been made in the field of thought are of no consequence if
52 - Mlcrocosmus
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they do not lead to some degree of happiness. This is the chance
that man has to say, “what of it"? No matter how we try to ig-
nore it in our scientific discussion it cannot be avoided and we
must come back to the realization that here is where all action
starts. It was Lotze’s ability to recognize the tremendous im-
portance of this factor that lead to his discussions in the be-
ginning of modem psychology.
The question arises as to whether man is going to react with
vigorous enterprise or passive submission to fate. In this re-
spect all of our philosophizing is of value for it tells each in-
dividual for himself the conditions under which he is living and
what it means to him in the long run. Thus it has often been sai
that if we know how a man acts we can to a certain extent tell
his philosophy of life. The practical emphasis is quite apparent
One cannot carry out logical results always from the evidence
that is set forth, but the general rule is yet in force. If we
try to apply it too strictly then we are getting into the area
of individual personality and this is the consideration of Lot-
ze *
s
whole concept of the universe. If one could know completely
all the whys and wherefores of individual personality he would
have insight into the very character of the ultimate Personality
or God himself.
In spite of our lack of knowledge in many respects yet there
do exist in man certain drives that keep him seeking in the face
of almost countless failures. He is animated by faith in the ex-
istence of truth. His difficulty comes when he tries to discover
in what thi s truth consists. To do that he must use investiga-
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tion and it often blunders. Still overriding this difficulty
comes a persistent effort and man seems to be characterized by a
duty or obligation. He must go on or lose hirnself in non-activ-
ity. Lotze shows two conditions of man’s ability to carry out
his desires for truth. First he has the power of experience to
develop and second he has the original presence of the germ upon
53
which this power operates. These are equally important and the
germ is essential to the power even though many affirm that the
only requirement is experience. He merely says that experience
is an expression of force that lies behind it.
Along with duty comes the idea of ought and man is face to
face with the moral question. Man is seeking not only truth and
happiness but affiliated with those, worth, which gives further
strength to his position in the life process. But just why and
how there is demanded so much from us by our inner Idea it is
hard to say. Kant believed that he had found a universal formu-
la for moral action, but he was candid enough to admit that he
did not know exactly why it had such binding authority over man.
This question has too often been put outside the realm of person-
al interest. Lotze felt that it was essential to consider man's
desire for happiness and look at things in the light of whether
they were pleasant or not to his inner sensitivity. “Somewhere
or other, this external apparatus and all its orderly sequence of
events must find its goal in an inner world of pleasure and of
54
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finite enjoyment."
53 - Microcosmus . Bk. V, p. 687*
54 - Microcosmus
,
Bk. V, p. 694.
-v.
* «
'
x 0' vt l It > t . . t •• i 1 o
.
Jx : 0
-
,
"
•
-
.
#
«
.
,
•
—
* * " ” t
79.
>
1
By this shift of emphasis to the criterion of enjoyment Lot-
xe does not mean to depreciate the laws that he has so often aff-<
irmed. He maintains absolutely the indispensableness of an or-
dered mechanism. But he feels that it cannot be that all reality
exists only for the sake of existing. "Must we believe that the
universe is so taken up with ceremony that it is concerned with
nothing but the realization of formal conditions?" The answer
lies in the consideration of v/orth. Specific feeling in every
case is the immediate indivisible transference into the language
of sensibility of the worth peculiar to each particular case.
There is an interaction by which the value of a thing is measured
as well as the mere fact of quantity and existence,. We are con-
stantly constrained by the inherent worth of things.
Every consideration of the world of fact and its interaction
refers finally to conscience for a decision. Man moves as he is
advised and warned by an inner sensitivity to the inherent value
of a thing or an event. It is this function that is the first
step into the mtaphysical realm. Much investigation, controversy
and elaboration may develop from it, but the key factor is the
simple act of each person's opinion, either more or less control**
led and developed, in regard to any specific function. As opin-
ion is exercised over a period of time under definite conditions
of education on the basis of that which has gone before it be-
comes in many respects standard. It continues to exercise its
own prerogative and yet it comes to know that certain general
55 - Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 692.
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rules are true and the attempt is made to follow these. This
gradually cuts down the danger of excess along lines that are de-
structive to personality and leads to an acquaintance with the
greater good. The alternative is that if the wrong choice is
made it leads to the greater evil. One cannot affirm this to be
true in every particular instance for the fact of growth and the
necessary prerequisites of freedom of the mind set up the condi-
tions for non-adherence to the general rule. Yet the general
rule prevails and the development of man through history bears
out this point.
As man puts his mind to the greater good he begins to elab-
orate those things that lead to a strong central good or the pur-
pose of divinely inspired life. Here are all the conditions for
humanism and yet they are worked out and possible only on the
basis of a theistic premise. Both bodily and spiritual life are
in all cases ultimately subordinate to general laws that are ap-
propriate to each. Although man may develop and nurture himself
within the range of these laws yet the divine Principle is felt
through the laws in everything that he does. That there may be
a reward toward which man may work and which justifies his ef-
56
forts there must be God first. This is the moral imperative that
gives man his place in the universal order. As man recognizes
this fact and then moves out to an understanding of it with con-
sciously directed activity he comes into the realm of devotion
which will be considered in the next chapter. He may be fulfill-
56 - Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion.
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ing all the conditions of human existence and achievement, but it
is not until he makes the break into the recognition of the cen-
tral Good toward which he is striving that he may fully experienc e
i
the joys of a devoted spirit.
--
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CHAPTER VIII
GOD AND DEVOTION
The discussion of devotion is the attempt to undertake an
independent philosophy. The study of man and his world through
psychology and physical science subsists on the level of interde-
pendence. Connection is the primary factor in this ordered realm.
But in devotion there is an entirely new and independent seeking
on the part of each particular individual. Connection is accep-
ted and then relegated to the background except as it serves to
illustrate. Religion is the foremost expression and the keynote
of religion is faith in God and His goodness. Man knows that God
is and that God is able to do something about life. Then it is
man’s supreme desire to contemplate and find a semblance of un-
derstanding in the personality of God. It is an attempt at com-
munication between mind and mind as they are the essence of per-
sonality both as related to man and to God.
Faith is not the same as science or moral principles. It
comes out of first impressions rather than rationalization and
implies a super sensuous. We have moved in stages of logical pro-
gression through tho conditions of ordinary existence and now we
are dealing in direct expression between man and God. While it
is true in a scientific study of life that the grounds of factual
knowledge are first to be considered, it is often just the oppo-
site in man's direct experience. At times he may see very deeply
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into the truth of a thing and then have to retrace his steps in
order to Justify himself to his own reason and that of others.
But first of all faith is a deep inner experience. It may be ex-
perienced in regard to science, art or morality, but it does not
consist of the principles of these things. It is a field of ex-
pression unto itself.
In order to find the grounds for faith we must first carry
out the philosophic advice of ancient G-reece as in a preceding
section, know thyself. Once we have done this we come to a new
recognition of values. But the recognition of " I" must assume
an opposition reference point and this gives us the possibility
of the knowledge of God. The opposition is in an inner state or
idea and not in outside factuality. Thus G-od may be personal and]
yet not limited to the finite. Our inner states do not have to
conform to external law. Yet in us as individuals the stimulus
of outside reality is needed for the recognition of our person-
ality. The Infinite does not need this. God is an eternally ac-i
tive thought. The individual also has this to a certain extent.
He can say, "I am the subject and object of my thinking", and is
able in one sense to stand apart from his world. He is dependent
upon his world for the conditions of growth but not for the real
thing that is growing.
The idea of mine is given through pleasjire and pain as we
react to these outside forces, but mine is within. It is only
that stlmula ab extca has an effect upon it. The Infinite would
create stimuli by his own mind even as he does for us through a
way that we can know it as human beings.
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The whole idea of creation is put forth on this level of
mind. God did not create the first conditions and then leave it
alone to go on as best it might. Further he did not create out
of something. Creation is simply the development of the Divine
Nature and it does not imply a law above God according to which
He develops. Activity founds law not vice versa. There is no
activity behind and above God. He is not the exemplification of
a pre-existing conception. It is not only possible but necessary
to begin and end with the one Being. Yet God is not empty ab-
straction. Our physical science is a continuous affirmation of
that fact. God is the all-in-all of qualities and attributes.
A term which implies prededing God is impossible and unsound to
science and metaphysics. All things are possible and all means
that which proceeds from God for there can be no contrast with
anything else. Eternal validity was founded though the founder
cannot be explanatorially named or distinguished from the truth.
Unconditional affirmation is given by God and recognized by Him
from the first. Theoretical are distinguished from moral truths,
but both are within a sphere that holds them in essential unity.
We easily distinguish between what we think and what is real
but this is not true of God. How could God distinguish between
thoughts as to one that is real and one that is not? God's
thoughts are reality in all perspective and if many of them are
expressed in a form that is concrete and orderly to us that by
no means denies their thought source. The complete thought of
this world must already have had in God this temporal order and
arrangement which realization is alone supposed to give to it.
i
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Creation is of spirits alone. Thus God creates finite spirits
and causes to arise in them cosmic thoughts as external percep-
tions for the divine Mind.
God permits thought that is His to become thought of other
spirits and thus His continual influence and operation cause His
own cosmic thoughts to arise and figure as the appearance of an
outer world surrounding them and capable of being perceived by
57
them. Nothing can exist for itself and otherwise than the thought
of another spirit, except a spirit itself. Spirits alone can be
called substances. Things are mere appearances in the minds of
spirits. This world of things that we observe need not be the
only world. Things are not real or created in themselves. They
must go back through spirits to God Himself. It is the seeking
mind that comes to the realization of these things. A mind that
has once been aroused to reflection cannot rest. It must go on
in the study of human existence to ask questions concerning its
origin, its place and significance in the world, its end and its
future life. It begins to work toward constructing a spiritual
order and no matter how slight or diverted its contribution it
comes to feel that each duty that it fulfills in this respect ha3
its final ground of obligation in its correspondence with the end
to which it is destined. This is not mere self development, that
which takes place in growth from the past to the future, but
rather a movement toward a goal which is very definitely set
57 - Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion .
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Search in this fashion is a common and indestructible fea-
ture of the human mind as it consists in the idea of valid and
binding truth and the sense of the universal righteousness with
58
a universal standard by which all reality must be tried. The one
capacity that lifts man irrevocably above the other stages of
life is that of becoming conscious of the Infinite. This does
not come from the influence of experience, a factor which would
tend to destroy its unique quality, but it has its origin in the
vary nature of our being and only requires the favoring condit-
ions of experience for its development. This leads us not only
to a consciousness of our own weakness as limited personalities,
but also a belief that as personalities we are called to an im-
perishable work in the world. With this realization the convic-
tion of an intimate connection between our earthly life and the
mysterious whole of this universal frame no longer interferes
59
with our care for the saall tasks of daily life.
But the field of faith offers many pitfalls particularly in
the realm of personal experience. The unsteadiness of our
thoughts and feelings so seldom allows us to hold fast that which
belongs to our peace of mind and makes it sound on in deep un-
broken harmony. We find that we must constantly revive and rees-
tablish the grounds of our excursions into this higher realm.
And yet the moments are so rare when we can feel the touches of
58 - Mlcrocosmus
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that super sensuous world as a living truth in our own lives. The
thing that ties those moments together and catches up the sagging
middles is a strong conviction based on carefully thought through
premises. We can depend on this if we are willing to develop it
at all times, in moments of leisure as well as periods of direc-
ted study. It may be the highest endeavour of man's consciously
directed mental activity.
Here is the full joyous assurance of the truth of faith in
God. It is the subjection in lowly humility of all one's own
strength to the grace of God. Christianity fits quite normally
into this concept and offers infinite stimulus to the under-
standing without binding it down to a narrow circle of thought;
and to the heart it offers full as much. The essential truth of
Christianity is particularly applicable. It is that the sole
truth and the source of reality with all its laws is something
of which the eternal worth must be felt in order to be known for
the link between experience and mental reflection must be main-
tained. From the reality thus known through feeling, man's un-
derstanding of himself comes to play a very direct part in his
search for an understanding of God.
Then man must join his understanding with that of others in
order that he may have an ever widsr approach. Thus he gives
himself to an organized communal group which is directing its at-
tention to this one phase of normal life. Tho church has its
clear function in a society of those who are redirecting them-
selves to life with a vision of betterment in mind. By better-
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ment is meant the driving of^ the will in the way that reason has
pointed out as it has discovered the real character of the uni-
verse* Under this condition the continued existence of the
church is desired as an objective reality in which the religious
life of the individual person issues forth, finding therein both
a guarantee that its efforts are well directed and also a spirit-
ual comfort as well as edification.
This activity on man’s part is an expression of the funda-
mental ground on which all activity endures. It is possible be-
cause of the supersensuous order of the world. This order con-
sists in the totality of the reciprocal action between things
taking place in the world at every moment. The actions are not
produced, changed and organized by a multitude of impulses run-
ning backwards and forwards between things, but they themselves
being comparable in meaning and hence subject to universal laws,
produce in one another impulses that become realized without the
help of any mediating mechanism and arrange themselves according
to their meaning (as constituents of the world’s content which
stand in need of one another) in that intellectual order which
60
is valid for them but does not exist between them.
The emphasis i3 on value and not on existence for existence
is merely a subsidiary attribute of value. Existence is the con-
dition that we know and must express, but it is a limited func-
tion. Value is first the reason for existence and then its in-
terpretation. As such it is limited by nothing and is the realm
88 *
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in which God subsists having no form or character other than that
given by God's intelligence. Because we are intelligent beings
we are able to exist as beings and at the same time to be inti-
that existence and value are two distinct and separate concepts,
but existence is possible within value and value cannot be con-
fined to mere existence. Existence is limited, value is unlimited
G-od is value and expresses Himself through existences. Man car-
ries out the same function except in his case the realm of exis-
tence is imposed to such a great extent upon him in the interest
of growth that value is simply a directing agent and creative
force and not a complete control. God uses value to an ultimate
degree, but never voluntarily gives up the form of existence both
for Himself as pure form and for His world as the content of par-
ticulars •
Yet how may we know this? The only way is through the link
that we have with God through the value insights and judgments of
our own minds. Thus the Infinite is actively efficacious in all
individual minds, as a power which in the whole spirit-world has
assumed innumerable harmonious modes of existence as it brings to
pass the exhibition of these same universal laws by the totality
of the various world pictures which arise in various individuals.
Also the events that occur within the world of the individual are
exercised by the Infinite with such accord in all that the same
things or the same world of things appear to all as a common ob-
ject of intuition, an external reality common to all and connect-
mately associated with God's realm as intelligences. It is true
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ing all.
Reality must be related to the Infinite though it is to be
found in each particular instance. It is that which we attribute
to things as the points from which action sets out and in which
it is consummated. Thus it is dependent upon the nature of that
to which it is to belong; it is the being of that which exists
for self. Then also there is self-existence. Mentality has its
expression from this point for the individual. Thus in this way
I
we can attribute to reality various degrees of intensity. And so
it follows that all things really possess in different degrees of
perfection that selfhood by which an immanent product of the In-
finite becaomes what we call real.
This higher level of self in a personal being, that is the
mind or ego that apprehends itself, is passive in feeling and ac-
tive in willing and is one in the remembrance in which it brings
past experiences together. As such we can regard it as a simil-
itude of that which is the nature of beings endowed with realness
or we can believe that we find the thing directly, itself, the
nature of all realness in this living self-existence. This is
the key to devotion. That we are distinct and yet a part of the
greater whole, that we may live in and at the same time observe
as though from without the world that we face, that we may exper-
ience and then direct our experience to consecrated expression
that leads to the goal of all life, communion with the Infinite.
The factor that makes our position unique is that we are able to
61 =-* Microcoomus, Bk. IX, p. 641.
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come closer to the fundamental nature of God as beings of life
that are like unto His own person.
Then we come to know that we are minds which continue imma-
nent in the Infinite as states, activities or modifications of It
Yet we exist for self and in this self-existence have the fullest
realness which we do not obtain by being detached from the Infi-
nite for apart from the Infinite self-existence becomes incompre-t
hensible. There is then no ground on which the self can depend.
There is no law precedent to all reality. It is only the living
mind that is and nothing is before it or external to it. The
self does not depend upon opposition to validate its selfhood as
the essence of all personality. The ego stands not because there
is a non-ego, but because it consists in an immediate self-exis-
tence which allows for contrast wherever it appears. Through
self-consciousness we come to realize this self-existence as our
knowledge increases. But knowledge through personal conscious-
ness is possible only through the influences of that cosmic
whole which the finite being is not and which therefore may be
called the non-ego. This does not mean that it must be contrast
ed with something foreign, but simply that it does not have with
in itself the conditions for its existence.
This limitation is not true of the Infinite. Thus it alone
has the possibility of self-existence which needs neither to be
initiated not to be continuously developed by something not it-
self, but which maintains itself within itself with spontaneous
action that is eternal and had no beginning. Further the element
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of personality is realized to the fullest extent in the infinite
Mind. Perfect personality id in God only, to all finite minds
there is allotted but a pale copy thereof. The finiteness of the
finite is not a producing condition of this personality which we
62
have but it is a limit and a hindrance to its development.
But man must have the conditions of free choice in order to
possess personality. It is his growth in choice that makes pos-
sible an advance in personality. God is related to this in the
three activities of creation, conservation and government. He is!
willing and able to set the conditions and help man to grow with-!
in them, but He will not destroy man's capacity and opportunity
for growth. God is good as He wills that man shall grow. Man is
good as his will is directed toward his own growth and conse-
quently that of others. "To thine own self be true and it will
follow as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any
63
man." It is not the actions but the will from which the actions
proceed that is the good. Good and good things do not exist as
such independent of the feeling, willing and knowing mind. Thus
the individual has obligations in every sphere. Living love un-
folds itself in one movement which is in the three aspects of the
good that is its end. Love creates the impulse and the conformi-
ty to law that keeps the impulse within the path that leads
64
toward the end of the good. Both love and the scientific atti-
62 - Microcosmus
.
Bk. IX, p. 688.
63 « Shakespeare, Hamlet
.
Act I, Sc. 3, 75»
64 - Microcosmus
.
Bk. IX, p. 722.
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tude are necessary to the attempt at reaching the whole good.
"For the universal, the class and the state of things belong
to the mechanism into which the Supreme articulates itself; the
true reality that is and ought to be is not matter and is still I
less idea, but is the living personal spirit of G-od and the world
of personal spirits which He has created. They only are the pla-
ce in which good and good things exist; to them alone does there
appear an extended material world by the forms and movements of
which the thought of the cosmic whole makes itself Intelligible
65
through intuition to every finite mind."
65 “ Microcosmus . Bk. IX, p. 728*
,,
,
>v
•
94
CHAPTER IX
THEORY
Now that the attempt has been made to establish Lotze's
place in history and his system of thought it is proper that the
attempt should be made to see in some sense his relationship to
the present and his interpretation for the future. In this chap-
ter the emphasis will be on the ideas concerning theory which
have been carried on from his thought or have been developed be-
cause of a stimulus that originated in his mind. Any thinker who
drops his system into the stream of human thought so that it
stirs the surface and causes ripples to go out in every direction
must be interpreted in the light of those ripples and the effect
they may have in the history of man's development as well as the
experience of man's relationship to the Infinite,
Those ripples will meet the ripples of other systems and thq
result will often be a mixture of ideas, but still the original
effect will be present and it is to the purpose of picking that
out that this part is dedicated. This does not mean that it will
be a complete analysis, but rather that it will be suggestive of
the widespread influence of this man and the essential truth of
what he had to say* His system was one of personal idealism and
he held to the principle of self-consciousness as the highest at-
tribute of life. His was a spiritualistic universe and mind was
the reality in that all the physical categories were merely the
expression of mind.
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John Buckham of the Pacific School or Religion brings out
»
the emphasis that Lotze put on personality as he aided, abetted
and strengthened the understanding of its metaphysical basis.
Buckham further shows how Lotze was carrying out the structural
principles laid down by Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Leib-
66
nitz and Kant as well as Lotze. This was a dominant note in Lot-
ze for he brought out carefully man's relationship to nature and
also to G-od on this basis of personality. Here he was showing
the important psychological principles that were appearing in
some instances for the first time in his thinking. But he could
not ascribe full personality to man. Albert C. Knudson of Boston
University agrees with Lotze when he says that perfect personal-
67
ity is possible only to the Absolute. Since the characteristic
is also possible to man and yet is not perfect in man the situa-
tion is provided for in which man may be made in the image of G-oc.
and yet be limited to his earthly function.
W. R. Matthews, a Dean of King's College, London, has re-
sponded to an essential theory of personality as put forth by
Lotze. He agrees with the idea that the nature of personality
68
does not consist in the contrast between ego and non-ego. This
allows for the contrast but does not make it essential as those
who emphacize the reality of matter affirm. The whole question
of the supremacy of mind or matter is involved here and Lotze is
trying to make room for both with mind inclusive of matter.
66 - Buckham, Contemporary American Theology
. p. 96 & p. 100.
67 - Knudson, The Doctrine of G-od
. p. 305.
68 - Matthews, God in Christian Experience
. p. 175#
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Edgar S. Brightman of Boston University, who along with^TCnudson
and others follows in the line of Bowne, a student of Lotze, giv-
es Lotze a leading place in personalistic thought. He cites the
theory of Lotze that the whole universe is personal as it is made
up of a mind or minds and their experiences. Then he lists out-
standing thinkers who have followed in the same line as well as
several who preceded Lotze. After Lotze come T. H. Green, James
Ward, McTaggart, Eucken, Royce, Miss Calkin3, Ladd, Bowne, Rich-
69
ardson and others. Brightman goes on later to show that Lotze
brought out more explicit thinking about values than had been ap-
parent up until his time. He agrees with Lotze when the position
that soul (mind) does not exist when thinking is not going on is
70
taken. And he shows how John Laird backs Lotze up on this point.
Mackenzie, a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge and Pro-
fessor in the University College of South Wales and Monmouth**
shire, relates Lotze to his day as he cites the ideas that are
exceedingly pertinent and important. He speaks of the fact that
71
Lotze was strongly interested in psychology. He refers to the
fine development of the stages of modern history and their influ-<
72
ence on culture. He mentions the aspects of consciousness as
73
they give us clues to our inner identity. He relates how Lotze
is able to develop the idea of value without giving it a hedonis***
74
tic sense. And finally he shows the clear view of politics that
69 - Brightman, -An Introduction to Philosophy , p. 138.
70 - Ibid., p. 175.
71 - Mackenzie, An Introduction to Social Philosophy
. p. 151.
72 - Ibid
. ,
p. 81.
73 - Ibid ., p. 217.
74 - Ibid .
.
p. 267.
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Lotze chows in his comments on votes. These are all in their own
way a contribution to the fund of knowledge for this man and par-
ticularly here they show Lotze* s relationship to a time and a
place that was not his own.
In a broad survey discussion of American philosophies of re-
ligion by Wieman and Meland, Lotze appears as an outstanding fig-
ure of influence. They speak of a tradition which shapes Amer-
ican religious thought in the theory of idealism and show how it
moved through Leibnitz, Shaftesbury, Berkeley, Kant, Fichte,
76
Schelling, Hegel to Lotze. He is compared with Renouvier in
France and McTaggart in England as being the particular exponent
77
of personalistic theories at that time. His objectivity of value!
is granted by Whitehead, Wieman, Spaulding and in a sense Dewey
78
of Harvard, Chicago, Princeton and Columbia respectively. Ideal-
ists have been primarily concerned with the social problem and in
this respect Hocking, Royce, Calkins and Dewey emphacize Hegel
79
but see the strong 'influence of Lotze also.
William James of Harvard pointed out Lotze* s well-known
proof of monism from the fact of interaction between finite
i
things. Universes of distinct beings while distinct must belong i
together beforehand as co-implicated already. Natures have an
inborn mutual reference each to each. James puts Lotze on a par
i
with Royce here and says though that both have a difficulty that
75 - Mackenzie, An Introduction to Soci al Philosophy , p. 382.
76 - Wieman & Meland, American Philosophies of Religion , p. 39*
77 - Ibid ., p. 134.
78 - Ibid
. ,
p. 320.
79 - Ibid ., p. 320/.
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keeps them from complete satisfaction. They work on the basis of
80
an argument that is purely verbal in his mind. Conger of the Un-
iversity of Minnesota points out that there are several leading
thinkers In America as well as England that have followed Lotze
as Bowne has done. He illustrates with 0. T. Ladd of Yale (1842-
1920), H. Sturt of Oxford (1863- ), 0. A. Coe in his Psychology
81
of Religion and 0. H. Howison (1834-1916). He also stresses Lot-
ze *s classifications of the fine arts as relative freedom from
82
the imitation of nature and from utility.
Hocking of Harvard grants Lotze* s affirmation that human law
only exists when it is thought of. This leads to the thought
that nature and its laws can only exist in a mind. A law, a way
of acting, is a generality, a universal, and a generality can on-
83
ly be apprehended by a mind. Leighton of Ohio State University
affirms the dualistic reply of Lotze as plausible even though he
does not feel that it goes far enough. It is that the passage
from one series to another is on the whole balanced and thus
84
there is no loss or gain. Ryan of the Catholic University of
America asserts Lotze' s statement that our belief in the soul'd
unity rests not on our appearing to ourselves such a unity, but
85
in our being able to appear to ourselves at all. The emphasis
once again is on the way in which mind runs through all of the
universe to Justify each part as activity is shown in that part.
to to to to
80 - William James, A Pluralistic Universe
. p. 55.
81 - G-eorge Conger, A Course in Philosophy, p. 141.
82 - Ibid ., p. 396.
83 • Hocking, Types of Philosophy
. p. 280.
84 - Leighton, The Field of Philosophy
. p. 207.
85 - Ryan, An Introduction to Philosophy
, p. 327.
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Alexander, a Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford and Professor;
i
in the University of Manchester, calls on Lotze to show what sci-
ence does as in elevating coincidences into coherences by the dis
covery of laws, simplifying under conceptions, unifying what is
at first multiplicity. Thus philosophy and science are one in
86
spirit. Lotze' s scientific mind is highly regarded and it is re-
ferred to again and again in various scholars as in Bergson, Mem-
ber of the Institute and Professor at the College of France, as
he says that Lotze himself suspected a fallacy in the laws of
87
specific energy. "Himself
"
gives an indication of the high opin-
ion that he had of Lotze. He also saw the conclusion from Lot-
ze's hypothesis of local signs as being the unextended and simply
qualitative character of the sensations by means of which we come
88
to form the notion of space. This is the key to mind control.
Taylor, a Fellow of Merton College, Oxford and Professor in
5t. Andrews, shows the wide range of Lotze' s general scientific
approach. He says that a constructive system as Lotze 's gives
first place to a general discussion of the most universal charac*
teristics ascribed in thought to a reality that is to be an Intel
89
ligible and coherent system and not a chaos. John Locke attempts
to clarify the thought of substance as applied to self and quotes
Lotze on the fact of the unity of consciousness being the fact of
90
existence as substance. Turner brings out the way that this
m m a* m *+ ** -m-m
86 - Alexander, Space Time and Deity
, p. 2.
87 - Bergson, Matter and Memory
. p. 50.
88 - Bergson, Time and Free Will
. p. 93.
89 ** Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics , p. 42.
90 - Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
. p. 194.
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broad approach of Lotze i3 able to see clearly into particular
problems. He relates Locke’s ideas and substance, Kant’s repre-
sentations and transcendental objects and Lotze ’s purely intelli<
ible reals and the perceived spatial world as these show marked
91
differences that make each set almost a case of opposites. Tur-
ner speaks from the University of Liverpool and tends to speak
the mind of those thinkers who are trying to rationalize the new
science with the old realm of ideas.
Bougl^f of the University of Paris is another writer who as-
serts that Judgments of fact and of value go back to Lotze and
his follower, Hitschl. He uses the position of Durkheim to point
92
this out as Durkheim is also one in the line of thought of Lotze..
Bosanquet, Fellow of the British Academy, who has often been re-
lated to Lotze says that Lotze reveals his clear position by ob-
jecting to the false ideas that often arise concerning what law
93
involves. For Lotze says that it is impossible to find a point
94
at which life is not in appearance mechanically conditioned and
the study of laws is tremendously important.
G-unn, Professor in the University of Melbourne and Fellow of
the University of Liverpool, lifts these laws to the Infinite
level in Lotze when he shows how Lotze ties up the temporal ser-
ies with the Infinite by saying that it depends on the nature of
things in themselves whether we shall be supplied with material
8-
91 - Turner, A Theory of Direct Realism
, p. 61.
92 - Bougl£, The Evolution of Values
, p. XXIX.
93 « Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 99.
94 - Ibid
. , p. 1597
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to synthesize. The important factor is that there is a directing
force which could only be mind behind and through the things in
themselves. Braham, a research student in Bristol and Liverpool
Universities, has a chapter on Lotze* s idealistic monism to show
where Lotze differs with Hegel in that he holds that differentia-
96
tions may not be essential to the unity of a personal G-od. This
modifies the strictness of Hegel and gives the individual room in
which to be himself if he cares to, but still does not take him
out of the realm of effective relation with the Absolute. Thus
Flewelling also brings up the fact that Lotze was the first to
renounce the absolute idealism of Hegel. He shows that Lotze was
trying to harmonize the differences between science and a practii
97
cal idealism.
Flewelling also goes along with Lotze on the essential fea-
ture of personality. He refers to Lotze as saying that reality
is that which can suffer change and yet remain the same through
98
change. This is personality as Flewelling sees it most concrete-
' iy. He carries out the per sonali Stic thought from Bowne as he
teaches at the University of Southern California after studying
at Boston University. In this same line again a reference may be
made to Brightman. He definitely says that since Lotze illus-
trates both the epistemological and the moral aspects, personal-
99
istic idealism may be described as Lotzean.
9 95
96
97
98
99
G-unn, The Problem of Time, p. 97*
Braham, Personality and Immortality in Post-Kant lan Thought
,
p. 152.
Flewelling, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy . p. 98.
Flewelling, Creative Personality , p. 71.
Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals , p. 171.
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Lotze’s range of Ideas is very broad and its influence is
just as broad it not more so. Lange of the Universities of Zur-
ich and Marburg under scientific psychology gives Lotze great
100
credit for his work on medicinal psychology. In another realm,
that of infinity, Vaihinger of Halle says that his new view was
101
foreshadowed both by Hegel and Lotze. Thus in rapid fashion Lot-
ze is able to move in Influence to the mind of one who is think-
ing on purely natural scientific grounds and then to the mind of
another who is relating his thought to the infinite. Then James
appears again in relation to psychology to say that Lotze has
made a deep suggestion in that previous reality is possible to
all of our existence to stimulate our minds to additions to thw
102
universe’s total value rather than merely being a passive factor.
Even those who do not agree with him, as many of the men re-
ferred to do not in much of their thought, are high in their
praise of his development of the position which he holds. Schil-
ler picks out Kant and Lotze to be studied in regard to the eth-
ical basis of metaphysics though he holds to a different position
103
himself. Schiller, A Fellow of Corpus Christ! College, Oxford
was close to the period of Lotze' s teaching and thus was recog-
nizing one of his own contemporaries. Lotze is credited with a
new insight by Alexander as he stated that action at contact is
perhaps less conceivable than at a distance because of force and
100 - Lange, History of Materialism
.
Vol. Ill, p. 175.
101 - Vaihinger, The Philosophy of ’ As If
’
.
p. 61.
102 - James, Pragmatism
, p. 256.
103 - Schiller, Humanism , p. 7*
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gravitation which is exercised through the whole.
Miss Calkins of Wellesley College credits Lotze with the or-
igin of the kinaesthetic theory for pressure or visual sensation
105
in psychology and Judd of the University of Chicage supports her
106
in this assertion. Also in regard to psychology Klemm of the Un~
iversity of Leipzig cites the mature form of spiritualism that is
a background of the most important psychologist of the nineteenth
107
century. This is based on natural science as psychology and yet
the ultimate ground of reality is still spiritual.
There are yet many other idealists in our day who have been
influenced greatly by Lotze* s own writings or thoughts of his
that have been transmitted through others. The mention of a few
in addition to those that have already been named may serve to
accentuate the realization that Lotze is a man who has been
strong, clear and persuasive in presenting these ideas that lead
to Idealism. Barrett of Princeton, Bakewell of Yale, Cunningham
of Cornell, Tsanoff of Rice Institute, Hendel of McGill and
Hoernle of the University of Witwatersrand are all exponents of
idealism and often stand close to Lotze. A man's theory must be
extremely clear and strong if it is to be applied to so many
fields and different modes of thought.
It does not hold that there is always agreement. That is
not the important thing. The significance of Lotze*
s
theory lies
104 - Alexander, Nature and Human Nature
. p. 94.
105 - Calkins, A First Book in Psychology
. p. 338.
106 ~ Judd, Psychology
. p. 1^8.
107 «• Klemm, A History of Psychology
. p. 30.
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in the fact that it is usable in the progress of thought. He was
not limited too greatly by his time. He wrote against much gen-
eral criticism of idealism in the Germany of his day and if he
had been a weak thinker he would have quickly succumbed to the
tide of opposing thought that was ruching in all around him. The
fact is that he laid down his ideas for the whole scope of
thought. He accounted for the practical experience of physical
nature and at the same time justified it in the light of the In-
finite. He was willing to be tied down by particulars until they
revealed the color of light that they were to throw upon the sit-
uation. Then he would be off on great general outlooks at the
universal environment in which he found himself. There was no
holding him. Lotze believed and when a particular fact was stub-*
born he kept at it until it opened and revealed its inner nature
for in all things was truth and if it could not be dug out im-
mediately at least the conditions for its appearance in the fu-
ture could be reasonably set up and this he proceeded to do.
The ideas which he had gathered up from the past were organized,
new ones were added, interpretations were made and the whole was
flung out to the advancing tide of thinkers to be gathered up by
them and carried on into new systems of the old eternal princi-
ples
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CHAPTER X
EXPERIENCE
'‘Life is more than logic." While the previous chapter dealt
with ideas this chapter is to deal with feelings. Thus at the
beginning appears a quotation that was common to both Lotze and
James and then Bowne as he carried out an attitude that was in
agreement with theirs. James even wrote Bowne to the effect that)
his book had stirred a responsive chord regarding this matter in
the mind of James. Lotze was definitely a leader in this way of
looking at things. He wanted to adhere to all the factual cir-
cumstances of natural science and the mathematical development
that was based upon it, but above all he was a seeking individual
trying to find his G-od and although he wanted to use the stepping,
stones of logic he didn’t want to feel that it would restrict hin).
Brightman objects strenuously to this attitude. In his mind it
implies that there is something about actual experience which
ought to lead us to accept beliefs that are logically inconsis~
tent or unsupported. He says that the cause of religion stands
108
or falls with the cause of reason. The difference is essentially
in attitude for in the final discussion neither Lotze nor Bright-
man would let go the factor that they do not emphacize. Lotze
would always insist on the need of logic and Brightman would
never deny the right of the personality to full expression in all
108 - Ferm, Contemporary American Theology t p. 59
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forma of thought. The point to be made is that these are two in-
dividual thinkers and they are influenced by their own approach
to life.
Thus the attempt will be made to see individuals and observe
to a greater or lesser degree the influence of Lotze upon them.
Macintosh, Professor at the Divinity School of Yale University,
states that in his student days he read Metaphysic by Lotze and
was profoundly impressed. His philosophy teacher who had taken
his Doctor's degree at Yale under Professor Ladd was partial to
Lotze and this led him to theistic personal idealism, but he also
I
went further on that basis to speculative idealism or neo-Hegel-
109
ianism. As already stated Bowne affirms his dependence on Lotze
106 *
110
and Lotze seems to have been an admirer of Bowne as a student.
But Lotze held to the larger system while Bowne moved particular-
111
ly within the whole toward the centrality of the self. James
shows an admiration for Lotze' s scheme though he felt that sever-
al things were lacking. He agreed with Lotze 's criticism of the
absolute of Leibnitz and felt the need of translation into real-
112
ity as Lotze attempted it. Smyth, a prominent clergyman, as many
others like himself finds Lotze *s idea of worth to be like his
own and thus shows the wide influence that Lotze had in the ec-
113
clesiastical field. Lotze 's high philosophical system was so
adapted that it could reach down into the practical and find liv-
109 - Ferm, Contemporary American Theology
.
p. 294.
110 - McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 37.
111 - Ibid ., p. 115.
112 - James, A Pluralistic Universe
, p. 120.
113 - Smyth, Chri stian Ethics, p. 41.
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ing expression*
Webb, a Fellow of St. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford, empha-
cizes the expression of Lotze in regard to the external social
relationships of God as a living love that wills the blessedness
114
of others. Thomson of Baker University refers to Lotze on the
question of self and draws out his illustration on the trodden
worm contrasting its suffering self with the whole remaining un-
iverse though he has no clear conception of what his 3elf and
115
universe may be.
Montague, a Professor at Barnard College, Columbia Univer-
sity, says that Lotze' s comment on Herbart's doctrine of degrees
of intensity in mental states led him on to a new experience in
animistic materialism that resulted in the spiritualistic cosmos
116
which in a sense can be expressed in physical categories. Here
is an example of a fine thinker in the present day finding a di-
rect expression of Lotze' s personality through his writings.
Paulsen of the University of Berlin points out that in Germany a
great period of neglect followed the reign of speculative phil-
osophy and after Hegel and Kant men like Fechner and Lotze be-
came the victims of an indifference which they had neither caused
117
nor deserved. But this opposition as with the Apologists of ear-
ly Christianity merely served to intensify the efforts of Lotze
to prove his point on a practical basis.
114 - Webb, Divine Personality and Human Life. p. 146.
115 - Thomson. The Springs of Human Action, p. 191.
116 - Montague. The Ways of Things, p. 666.
117 * Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 2.
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James Ward quotes Lotze on the beginning of metaphysics ly-
ing in ethics and then quotes his own way of stating the same po«4
118
sition from the psychological standpoint. Ward, a Professot? at
Cambridge, Fellow of the British Academy and Corresponding Member
of the Institute of France, refers to Lotze in several other
places and leans heavily on Lotze* s clear insight into many psy-
chological situations. Viscount Haldane, a student of Lotze,
brings out the characteristics of his physical presence. He
speaks not only of Lotze* s great intellectual stature but also of
his high moral worth, Lotze dominated listeners with the sense
of his personality and with his emphasis on personal morality was
very like Kant in nature, Haldane feels that Lotze's personality
was even greater than his work and perhaps this is true. A man'si
work stands alone in its own right, but at the same time it is a
reflection of his personality and the degree to which he was wil-
ling to seek the truth. Then again it is the idea from the mind
that has its effect on other minds and the personality through
the work that influences other personalities. Even in Lotze's
own work it is not the existent that really matters, but rather
the interpretation of that existent and the ability to discover
how that existent leads us to the ultimate Value in G-od. Haldane
also brings out the fact that along with Herbart, Lotze has in-
119
^luenced the revision of the sciences of psychology and logic.
The pathway that one man has trod leads to others that yet go on
from this point and in the same general direction.
118 - Ward, Essay s in Philosophy , p. 168.
119 - Haldane, The Pathway to Reality , p. 142,
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Urban of Dartmouth College says that the contrast of the
judgments of value and the judgments of fact found first philo-
\
3ophical expression in Lotze and Ritsehl. This was an axiologi-
cal standpoint to assert the autonomy of values. The epistemo-
120
logical and psychological problems were brought close together.
Boodin refers to Lotze* s polyphonic unity of the universe as an
121
aesthetic unity of purpose in the world. He also makes reference
122
to Lotze' s idea of the kinship of truth and beauty and the poetrj)
that was early in Lotze *3 mind and resulted in a volume of poems
had its philosophical expression to Influence a man in the Uni-
versity of California at Los Angeles. Keats' exaggeration of
the identity of truth and beauty is considered on a logical level|
and Justified to a certain extent in the thought of Lotze.
Lotze is cited by Piper and Ward in their course book for
Syracuse University as showing a Justification of creeds which
give firmness, stability and definiteness of outline to religious
123
belief. They recognize his value for the religious life and even
the life of the church as he sets up many high standards concern-
ing ways of knowing G-od. Wilbur Urban, a Professor in Trinity
College, Hartford, Connecticut and former Fellow at Princeton Un-
iversity, pays tribute to Lotze* s attempt to apprehend ultimate
value through the consciousness of harmony which releases the
124
highest inspirations of reason. This statement has effect upon
120 - Urban, The Intelligible World
, p. 141.
121 - Boodin, A Realistic Universe
.
p,,.63.
122 - Ibid
., p. 308.
123 « Piper and Ward, The Fields and Methods of Knowledge
, p. 338*
124 - Urban, Valuation Its Nature and Laws, p. 426.
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the realm that thi3 chapter Is interested in. It is the idea
that reason can only develop when the mind is persuaded to an ob-
jective and will work for it no matter how great the physical
difficulties may be. In the case of any great thinker such as
Lotze it is the pursuit of truth and to that end he recognizes
j
the importance of the drive of emotion.
Moore of Western Reserve University observes that Lotze fol-
lows Kant in adding feeling to intellect and will as part of the
125
whole method which is characterized by the unity of the three.
Here is the method of man's searching for the truth and it delves
into every realm. The soul is a dominant note here and John
Laird of Queen's University of Belfast draws heavily on Lotze in
his expression of The Idea of the Soul. Consciousness is lifted
out of space in its essential nature as an expression of the soul
and Laird refers to Lotze in that, to be in a place means simply
and solely to exert action from that place and to experience the
126
actions or effects that reach that place. Consciousness occupies
position merely to further the relationship of the mental and
physical. Inge, a Fellow of Hertford College, Oxford, shows by
quote that Lotze is really in sympathy with mysticism though Inge
127
thinks he misses the mark in many aspects of his argument.
Merrington, a Lecturer at the University of Sydney and a
Research Student at Edinburgh, shows a strong influence from Lot-*
a'iAv, 128
ze though the two differ ©n their opinion of the Absolute. He
125 - Moore. Rifts in the Universe, p. 74*.
126 - Laird, Problems of the Self, p. 75.
127 - Inge, Christian Mysticism, p. 31.
128 - Marrington. The Problem of Personality, p. 110.
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alao brings out the way that Rashdall followa Lotze in regarding
129
personality as an ideal directly pertaining to G-od. McDougall of
Harvard calls Lotze the most brilliant and thoroughgoing modern
130
defender of animism. There is a suggestion in this word of un-
controlled spiritualism, but that is the furthest thing from Lot-
ze’s thought* Broad, a Fellow in Trinity College, Cambridge,
gives Lotze as an arguer of mentalism which is favorable to human
131
survival, the point that Broad is trying to develop. But he
points out also that Lotze felt that his system did not necessi
tate human survival and left it as an open question*
Coe of Northwestern calls on Lotze ’
s
support for his argu-
ment concerning the interaction between the physical and the men-*
tal realms, Lotze attempted to work out a general scheme in
which the temperaments and ages in a human life tended to conform
At a certain age one type of temperament might be reasonably ex-
pected, There was no attempt to make this a demanding assertion,
but rather a matter of persuasive influence. Lotze was very con-
scious of the emotions and recognized at the same time that they
were often due to quite natural physical causes. Again the field
of psychology appears strongly in his thinking and we realize
that to his mind the fluctuating personality was a very real
thing though his principle aim was to drive through all of these
factors to the one fundamental purpose of personality. Just be-
129 - Herrington, The Problem of Personality
. p. 124.
130 - McDougall, Body and Mind
, p. 82.
131 - Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature
. p. 519*
132 - Coe, The Spiritual Life
,
p. 231.
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cause a man is set on one great goal it does not mean that he can
not interpret and invsetigate the many minor factors that are es-
sential to life. In fact his greatness depends on the extent to
which he does investigate and take account of all factors to ap-
ply them to the one great whole that he seeks.
Through all of these minor things is threaded the great
stream of expression that leads to the sea of knowledge. This
expression is governed by law so that unity is possible. Bright-
man says that Lotze along with Kant, Heraclitus and Darwin taught
that in all change there is a law which is the basis of real
133
knowledge. Thus the one completeness has its complexity and it
is for each individual to v/ork his way through these phases of
perplexity. The individual learns by experiencing and there are
some truths that he will never know unless he takes full advan-
tage of the feeling side of his method. Lotze seems to be an ex-
ample in his own life of just this sort of thing. In his student
days and at a relatively early age he is fired by the desire to
know that which is not fully explained by his teachers. It is
this that starts him off on his long search and results in his
deeply penetrating system of thought.
Burnham of Clark University relates this fact to his studies
in psychology. He says that Lotze is an example of one who is
interested in philosophic studies as the result of the doubting
mind of the adolescent. He eites the fact that Lotze wrote his
134
Metaphysic at twenty-four years of age as a result of this long-
133 - Perm, Contemporary American Theology
.
p. 66.
134 - Burnham, The Wholesome Personality
, p. 571.
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ing for something definite behind all the unsupported theories
that he was listening to on every hand. Thus Lotze was true to
himself and his own personality in developing his general theory
on personality. Perhaps it is this fact that makes it possible
for Burnham also to write that personality is the great gift and
the philosophical conception of the ideal of personality culmin-
ated in Lotze. He calls to mind the fact that Lotze applied this
belief and theory to the political situation of Germany when he
spoke to a nation that had been humiliated by Napoleon to say
that they 3hould dwell on progress in literature and science for
135
"the German citizen is everything, Germany is nothing".
This opens up the tremendously involved social issue that
follows from Lotze' s theory. It cannot be said that he was lim-
ited to the hermitage of thought. His views were of tremendous
consequence to his own day and to all ages of human society. He
often referred to the fact that he was following Christian phil-
osophy as it had been expressed in Jesus and later through the
members of the Christian church. His ideas were so far-reaching
and inclusive of all stages of life that every individual person-
ality would be effected. There is no way out of his position ex-*
cept that of facing one's self and then being driven by such ob-
;
servatton to the consideration of others as like natures. The
one supreme Being stands behind all life and every individual is
related to God.
Conklin, a Professor of biology at Princeton, ended his stu-t
dy of the function of organic life with the quotation, "one far-
135 * Burnham, The Wholesome Personality
, p. 598.
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off divine event to which the whole creation moves”, Lotze
would have ascribed to this. He knew the physical world to such
an extent that he realized it could not stand alone apart from
mind and the mind of God must be the focal point of all of its
activity, Wilson of Syracuse University in dealing with the
137
3elf and its world devotes a long section to the world as value
and thus puts himself in debt also to Lotze. The relationship
.
that Lotze established between mind and body is one that cannot
be put aside. It often went far beyond efforts of the past and
'
found a position that allowed individuality and yet preserved the
unity of the whole not merely as a Justification for belief, but
a necessity for that which exists,.
The process of naming others such as Armstrong of Wesleyan
who testified that his view of realism had been reached largely
138
through the influence of Lotze might go on and on. The lists of
those who have felt the sway of his, power of thought could be
made longer and longer. Yet these statements are significant in
lieu of a larger discussion on this topic. They show a tendency
and that is their major purpose. The culmination of Booth’s ob-
servations on Martin Luther may al3o be applied to Lotze for
these words are valid for all life. ” Is it not enough to see hin}
grow in normal strength ——~? Eternal validity is not given to
men. Yet in a world of swiftly moving change, he sought and held
steadfast the ancient truth. -*--18 this not enough for our hu-
" ~
136 - Conklin, The Direction of Human Evolution
, p. 247.
137 - Wilson, The Self and Its World .
138 - Adams and Montague, Contemporary American Philosophy « p. 119,
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CHAPTER XI
INTERPRETATION
As the conclusion of this short work is approached there
must be general findings that rise out of the main body of its
considerations. In the first place Lotze was seeking a goal for
life that would also be the Justification of all existence. "He
looked for a city which hath foundations whose builder and maker
140
is God." The doubting period of his early years had culminated
in a great desire to find something positive in which he could
believe because it was logical and reasonable and because it
tended to satisfy the longing that was in his soul. Every leade
I
in thought and action, in fact every individual who accomplishes
something creative is driven by an inner urge that will not rest
until that thing is accomplished. Lotze' s drive carried him
through the world and self, but it never let up or was deterred
from its course until the climax had been reached. His was the
work of an observer of the universal scene of life, but it was
also the work of one who participated in all the struggles of
life and felt its sorrows and Joys. He strove toward a goal that
was real and vital to his own consciousness.
r
In the second place Lotze was a critic. He could not toler-
ate for himself the extreme idealism of Hegel which drove the
world of science into the realm of the abstract. In like manner
140 - Hebrews 11:10.
. .. one-,'
*
u
'
.
.
.
'> »
.
*
-
.
he rebelled against the materialists ~who would not admit that
anything was real except matter. He could not see either of the|
se two extremes that excluded each other from their consideration
^ of reality. He had been bred in the traditions of the Hegelian
school and he hungered for facts. Particulars were of the great-
's st importance in his mind for he knew that the whole could not
be known until its specific parts had been investigated. But at
the same time Lotze was not to be limited to these particulars.
He would use them as far as they would go, but he would go fur-
I
ther. He showed that their categories as based on natural sci-
ence were not enough to cover the whole realm of intelligible
existence and philosophy was needed to work side by side with
science. Jones of the University of Glasgow who wrote a main
work on Lotze thinks that Lotze' s principle service is that he
co-ordinated the truths of these two opposing systems, but he
does not give Lotze credit for going on to the combination of
141
them. His work was on the doctrine of thought as Lotze approach-
ed it and this does not seem to give him as clear a perspective
of Lotze' s whole position as he might have. But he did realize
that Lotze was especially able in his criticism of the two sys-
tems that were then as now in conflict.
Thirdly Lotze is dependent on the history of thought up un-
til his time. This is true of every thinker and interpreter of
life, but Lotze seems to have carried this out to a more advanced
degree than most. He immersed himself in the history of man's
141 - Jones, A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze
. p. 2.
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culture and looked for Insights into all fields as well as makin
his own investigations into the field of knowledge. Lotze was
anxious to study man as a psychological expression as well as one
who merely held to abstract theories. Although the study of that
which we know as modern psychology had not been considered very
intellectually respectable Lotze realized that it was a way out
1
. ||
of the dilemma that presented itself. Thus he found many points
of agreement with the Greeks at the same time that he was criti-
cizing their theories of life. He caught the significance of
the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches to life and made each a
part of his own. He examined the fields of art and literature
and especially their effect upon the thought of man. The years
of the past gave him a broad approach and once he had seen the
full sweep of history he was never to be held down by narrow par-
tial truths. He wanted truth that would be universal in its
scope and true for all situations no matter how minute.
Thus in spite of his dependence on the past Lotze was in the
fourth place an innovator in thought. He did not create much
that was new in the way of system, but there were too many of
those existing already. He brought out the Individual personal* i|
ity as it had never been considered before and he related it to
all of this scope of knowledge which had been considered. His
1
1
study was of culture because culture was the expression of man's
j
nature. Systems were not the most important thing. They were
merely subsidiary aids to the realization of the great worth of
man's nature as a person. But the study of man himself would
lead to a system that was all inclusive, not merely a system but
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an expression of that which is and a reason for its being. A sy-
stem that was so real it could only be applied to a mind that
knew all of reality and the mind that could fulfill this function
was the mind of God. There was no other way. Bilen must recognize
that the same thing that had been leading their aesthetic thought
through the ages was the realization of their practical function.
Nature was the way to God as well as the mysticism of the inner
spirit. God was the only character that could meet both factors
and not be found wanting in either. The way to God was through
personality expressed in the world of physical objects and here
Lotze spanned the gap between mind and body and so intensified
his theory to the living reality that the gap disappeared into
nothingness. Others sought the way out through system and the-
ory. Lotze found it in life.
In the fifth place Lotze expressed his theory in his own
life. As a personality he stressed the good nature that was es-
i
sential to his metaphysics. Along with his belief that the mind
was able to effect physical nature he tried to change and influ-
ence the objective realm through his work against suffering and
evil. Thus Lotze carried out one of the conditions of being a
real philosopher. He applied his theory to life.
Finally the question as to what form of reality should be
assigned to the realm of ends must be considered. Thomas in his
work on Lotze * s theory of reality feels that Lotze did not an-
swer Kant’s question as to how reason can be one both in the prac-
tical and theoretical spheres. He states that Lotze in his keen
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analysis widened the difference between these spheres. But thislj
work has sought to show the fundamental unity of existence as
Lotze 3aw it. Thus we must disagree with and at the same time
affirm the conclusions that Thomas reached. Lotze did intensify
the individuality of each field and in doing so made one the
source of activity and the other the result. The mechanism of
natural science and bodily function is the way in which the mind
of God and to a lesser extent the mind of man articulate them-
selves. Both side3 are needed, but neither is complete in itself.
The gap is obliterated by the living personal spirit of God and
the world of personal spirits which He has created. Theory 3hows
the two spheres to be distinct but living personality draws the
143
two into unity in itself.
142 - Thomas, Lotze * s Theory of Reality
, p. 213
•
143 *» Refer to p. 93 of this same work.
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ABSTRACT
OF
THE THEISM OF HERMANN LOTZE
Hermann Lotze is found in an age of philosophy that is mark-
ed "by an abundance of material and also a great deal of confusion
The field of physical science is just beginning to open up its
new horizons o In this period he opposes the extreme idealism of
Hegel and meets the inruehing tides of science to establish a
middle ground between the two that may be known as personal
idealism. Lotze is in essential agreement with the emphasis of
Plato and also that of Aristotle. Their extremes are tempered by
his practical mind and their fundamental arguments are reempha-
cized. The span from these two thinkers to the time of Lotze
finds many who are carrying on the essential ideas that Lotze
!
llater incorporates into his system.
Lotze regards nature a3 objective and essential to any study
concerning reality. He brings out its distinctness, but in doing
this shows that the mechanism of nature leads to one ultimate
source of all its activity in mind. In the final stage this is
the mind of God. He considers life to be the means by which ac-
tivity is possible. Life is the factor that makes relationship
between mind and nature possible and it is the direct expression
of God through all things, both subjective and objective. Lotze
puts man in the highest position possible in a theistic universe.
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Man is characterized by personality and personality is an attri-
bute of G-od. The distinction between the two is that man is lim-
ited and G-od is not. Personality is the only full expression of
spirit and creation is of spirits alone. Thus the world and in-
dividuals are possible because of the existence and reality of
spiritual personality. Devotion is the highest calling of man’s
nature. He is privileged to recognize the world in which he live s
and then work back through that world and himself to closer com-
munion with G-od in regard to recognition. This is the ultimate
of man's mental activity.
After Lotze’s time it was discovered that his influence was
very great. On the level of theory he was one of the leaders in
the field of modern psychology. His theories of physical nature
were often adhered to by those who followed him as well as his
theories concerning metaphysics and the spiritual realm. More
|| intense that that were the influences of his activities in the
realm of experience. Many individuals found a personal response
to him and those who were not thus privileged were often stirred
by the spirit of personality in his writings. He was seeking a
goal for life that would also be the justification of all exis**
tence. He was a critic of the history cf thought up to his time
i!
and especially that directly preceding him. In this respect he
depended greatly upon the truths that he was able to dig out of
the past. He was an innovator in thought as he trod paths that
I
!
had not been dealt with before in the way that he considered them.
He expressed this theory in his own life and stood finally on the
fact that creation is of spirits alone.
•,
'
>
.
'
' •
. .
•
,
-
.1
"
-
.
; , J
’
.
./ . ,
. >
'
:
'
>
• -
‘
1
_
:
'
- ;
.
i
1
-
.
_
.
*
’
•
*
.
-
.
>• <
.
*
,
*
V'"-'
s i
’ I '• <
,
.
*


